Digital Commons @ University of Georgia
School of Law
Scholarly Works

Faculty Scholarship

3-1-2010

"Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of
History
Harlan G. Cohen
University of Georgia, hcohen@uga.edu

Repository Citation
Harlan G. Cohen, "Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and the Lessons of History , 84 Tulane L. Rev.
957 (2010),
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_artchop/864

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

"Undead" Wartime Cases: Stare Decisis and
the Lessons of History
Harlan Grant Cohen*
References to the "lessonsofhistory"areubiquitousin law Nowhere has this been more
apparent than in recent debates over US counteterronsmpolicy Inresponse to the Bush
Adminisamtions reliance on World War li-era decisions-Ex parte Quirn, In re Yamashita,
Hirota v. MacArthur, and Johnson v. Eisentrager-opponenthave arguedthat these decisions
have been rejected by the "'lessonsof history" They argue that the history of wartime cases is
one marked by Executive aggrandizemen4 panic-driven attacks on civil liberties,and overly
quiescentcouts-noneof which should be repeated.
But what does it really mean to invoke the lessons ofhistory? Is it merely a rhetorical
device or shouldit have some role in determiningthe staredecisis effect of these old wartime
cases? The fact that each ofthe four cases cited by the Bush Adinstrationhassince been set
aside by the United States Supreme Court raises questions about whether stare decisis ever
applied to them at all Can the lessons ofhistoryanswerthose questions?
Tis Article explores the potential legal meanings of the "lessons of history" It
distinguishes and weighs a number of possible models for how history might be used
(1) history as facts complicating or undemining prior decisions; (2)history as precedentreplacemen4 with thejudgments ofCongress,the Executive, or others takingtheplace ofthatof
judges; and (3)history as a vehicle for constitutional principles, like a fear of Executive
aggrandizementin wartme or a beliefthat 'he Constitutionis not a suicidepact." Usingthe
four key cases here as examples-Quinn, Yamashita, Hirota, and Eisentrager-the Article
examines the benefits andpitfallsofallowing courts to engage in each ofthese opes ofanalysis
The result is a clearer understandingnot only of how history should affect the fate of old
wartime cases, but ofthe roles historycan playmore generally
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With the United States Supreme Court's decision in Munaf v
Geren in 2008, the last in a series of World War II ghosts was
temporarily put to rest.' Following the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, the Bush Administration began reintroducing the country to
a series of long-forgotten protagonists in World War H-era decisions.
Richard Quirin, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Koki Hirota, and Lothar
Eisentrager were each revived and pressed into service in defense of
the Administration's policies in the "War on Terror." Faced once again
with their fate, the Supreme Court has generally returned them to their
graves:
Munaf v Geren2 distinguished Hirota v MacArthur,3
Boumediene v Bush distinguished or limited Johnson v Eisenrager,
Rasul v Busff disavowed In re Yamash'ta, 7 and Hamdan v Runsfelf

distinguished Exparte Quinn.9 It is not at all clear that they are there
to stay.
What should we make of the appearance, and eventual exit, of
these ghosts of wars past? In a sense, the appeal to World War II
precedents was unremarkable. The shock of the September 11 attacks
on the United States reminded many of the last major attack on U.S.
soil, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Reaching for ways to
describe the new threat to the nation-the new war that would have to
1.

128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).

2.
3.

Id.
338 U.S. 197 (1948).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
542 U.S. 466 (2004).
327 U.S. 1(1946).
548 U.S. 557 (2006).
317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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be fought-many Americans turned to the example of World War II,
the "Good War," fought by the "Greatest Generation."'" The Bush
Administration's appeals to that era's precedents in constructing its
legal policies seem even less remarkable. The Administration did what
lawyers always do when faced with new scenarios: it scanned the past
for analogous precedents. Following sixty years of relative peace,
administration lawyers had to look to the World War II era for cases
involving detention of enemy combatants and trials by military
commission. When the policies based on those precedents were
eventually challenged, lower courts, faced with Supreme Court
precedents supporting administration policies, followed principles of
stare decisis and based their decisions on those precedents.
And yet, one by one, each of these World War II precedents has
been set aside or distinguished by the Supreme Court. The rejection of
these decisions suggests that the appeal to World War II was far less
wise than it might have first appeared. In fact, a closer look at the
particular period and decisions begs the question whether they were
ever worthy of stare decisis (or even precedential effect) at all. Few of
the traditional justifications for stare decisis seem to apply to these
cases. These cases had been, for the most part, lost to history before
September 11-few remembered Quiin' or H!rota'2-and the cases
were not the source of significant lines of precedent. Each is arguably
unique; similar situations do not seem to have arisen over the
intervening years and citations to these cases are few. As we have now
been reminded, the facts of each were also highly unusual. The cases
were decided very quickly, in a sense of panic, under pressure from the
U.S. Government, and in the fog of war. Some of the decisions were
criticized even then for what seemed like a whitewashing of unfair
Moreover, standing
procedures and evidentiary discrepancies.
primarily for Executive-branch discretion, the cases did not become
the source of important rights relied on by individuals. 3 All of these

SeegenerallyTOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998).
10.
11.
Quiir, 317 U.S. 1.
12.
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
13.
Though as Justice Scalia argued in dissent in Rasul, the decisions were relied
upon by the Bush Administration. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,497-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting)

("Normally, we consider the interests of those who have relied on our decisions. Today, the
Court springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the
federal courts even though it has never before been thought to be within their jurisdiction
)
...
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facts suggest that these unique wartime cases are different from other
precedents and deserve more scrutiny and less reliance than others."
How much weight then should these cases be given? In the
absence of other traditional doctrinal justifications for stare decisis, the
main reason left for respecting these precedents seems to be a belief
that there is wisdom in the decisions of prior courts-wisdom that
should not be discarded too quickly. Here, however, that wisdom is
hotly debated and inextricably intertwined with difficult unanswered
questions about the meaning of American history. The traditional
history of these wartime cases paints them in a very negative light.
Grouped together with the Court's notorious decision in Korematsu v
United States, which upheld the internment of Japanese-Americans, 5
these cases have come to be seen as symbols of how an overly
deferential Court can unwittingly aid an overly aggressive Executive in
unnecessary, panic-driven wartime attacks on civil liberties.'6 These
World War II cases are seen as part of a larger pattern of wartime
excess that includes the Aliens and Seditions Acts, World War I attacks
on free speech, and the Palmer Raids, which demonstrate the dangers
of an unchecked Executive, the power of jingoism, and the ease with
which minority groups can become targets during a crisis.'7 For those
taking this view of history, the important precedent-the lessons to be
followed-are the counter-reactions during peacetime, the
determination, once the fog has lifted, that the government's actions
were unconstitutional or wrong. It is these determinations made
during calm reflection, not those made by wartime courts, that should
carry the most weight.
This view of American history, although popularly held, is not
uncontroverted. A second counter-history has questioned the value of
peacetime reassessments. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, for
14.
Seegenemllyinfr Part II.B. for a fuller discussion of the traditional standards for
applying stare decisis and how they apply to these cases.
15.
323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944).
16.
See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILous TIMEs 306 (2004) (discussing fallout and
regret by decision makers after Korematsu); David Cole, No Reason To Believe: Radical
Skepticism, Emergency Power,and ConstitutionalConstraint 75 U. Cm.L. REv. 1329, 1349,
1353 (2008) ("Our own history demonstrates that it is far easier for government officials to
declare emergencies and take on new powers than to declare the emergency over and give up
those powers.").

17.
See STONE, supm note 16, at 13 ("[I]n each [wartime period] the United States
went too far in sacrificing civil liberties ....
");
Cole, supm note 16, at 1349 ("The history of
emergencies in the United States reflects a consistent pattern in which government officials
target liberty-infringing security measures at the most vulnerable, usually foreign nationals,
while reassuring the majority that their own rights are not being undermined.").
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example, have argued that one can only really understand the needs of
a crisis during the crisis, that hindsight only distorts the nature of the
threats observed at the time and the appropriateness of a given
response. 8 It is to the wartime, not the peacetime, decisions that we
should look for lessons on the proper balance between security and
liberty. Posner and Vermeule thus go so far as to suggest that we are
incapable of judging even whether the notorious Korematsu was
rightly or wrongly decided.'9 For them, the fact that prior Courts have
consistently, in their considered judgment, chosen to defer to the
Executive in wartime is evidence that such deference is the wisest
policy. Despite the prevalence of both sets of arguments, little attempt
has been made to reconcile them, to determine which history should
be relevant and when.
These World War II cases might best be thought of as "undead?'
They no longer seem to be live precedents, the passage of time and
reflection having sapped them of their vigor, but they are not quite
dead either, no later decision inflicting the final fatal blow.2° Instead,
they refuse to be forgotten, lurching back into the frame. The dilemma
posed by the rival histories of these cases thus resembles the one faced
by the hero of a zombie movie: whether to put these decisions out of
their misery once and for all or to try to save them and give them back
their former lives.2'
It is this dilemma that animates this Article. This Article
considers the fate of these undead wartime cases. It asks two
See ERIc A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEuLE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
18.
LIBERTY, AND THE CouRTS 5 (2007). Cass Sunstein and Jack Goldsmith have made a similar

point, noting that the peacetime backlash against wartime curbs on civil liberties can be
traced in large part to the United States' unusual record of victories in war. Victory
diminishes the perceived threat posed by the United States' enemies. After each war, the
Government's actions are judged by many to have been unnecessary and excessive. Had the
wars ended differently, Sunstein and Goldsmith point out, the judgment of history might have
been quite different. Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tibunals and Legal
Culture. What a Differnce Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261,285 (2002).
POSNER &VERMEULE, supm note 18, at 21-22, 113.
19.
20.
This was certainly true prior to the recent line of "War on Terror" cases, but it
arguably remains true even now. Beholden to stare decisis, the Court has generally declined
to overrule these decisions outright in the "War on Terror" cases, instead straining to
distinguish their facts. See inifa Part IH. At times, critics have argued that the Court's narrow
reading of those earlier decisions has been unreasonable or objectively incorrect. See, e.g.,
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 493 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Eisentragesdirectly-onpoint statutory holding makes it exceedingly difficult for the Court to reach the result it
desires today.").
There seem to be at least three types of "undead" in popular culture: ghosts,
21.
zombies, and vampires. I am ambivalent whether one of these is a better description of these
cases than the others.
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intertwined questions: (1) how to interpret and apply the lessons of
wartime or emergency history, and (2) what effect to give to the
decisions
made under crisis conditions. Should wartime cases like
Quirn 22 Eisentager23 Yamashta24 and Hhorta 5 be given the same
precedential treatment as other cases? And to what extent should our
understanding of the history of those cases dictate their fate? In the
absence of precedent, but the presence of history, what should courts
do?
These are more difficult questions than they might first appear.
Although it is common to disparage a precedent as old, or to argue that
fundamental changes in circumstances have undermined a prior rule, it
remains unclear exactly how such determinations should be made, or
when, in the absence of a contrary line of decisions, history can trump
precedent. Similarly, despite widespread statements that today's courts
(and policy makers) must learn the lessons of history, it is unclear how
courts should discern what those lessons are. If history is to play some
doctrinal role in determining the fate of unique wartime cases, how
should courts approach that analysis? What role should the history
play? Is the history simply a set of facts complicating or undermining
the prior decisions? Should it take the role normally filled by
precedent, with the judgments of other actors-historians, the public,
elected officials-taking the place of that ofjudges? Or should history
serve as something else, as a repository of deeply held constitutional
principles, like a fear of Executive aggrandizement in wartime or a
belief that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact?""
22.
23.

ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).

24.
25.

InreYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).

26. In essence, this Article probes the question posed by the paradigm of undead
wartime cases, Korematu. It is easy to find statements that Korematsu has been overruled
by the judgments of history, that while still on the books, it is no longer a live precedent. See,
e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 584 E Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Dennis J.
Hutchinson, "The Achilles Heel" of the Constitution: Justice Jackson and the Japanese
Exclusion Cases, 2002 Sup. CT. REv. 455, 485 (2002). The question one must ask is, why?

What is it about developments since Korematsu that deny the decision stare decisis? In the
case of Korematsu, we are faced with an almost perfect storm of factors: congressional
apology and compensation of detainees; passage of the Non-Detention Act; President
Clinton's bestowal of the Medal of Freedom on Fred Korematsu; the vacating of Korematsu's
conviction by a district court; apparently incontrovertible historical evidence that the threat of
Japanese espionage was willfully exaggerated, if not maliciously fabricated; offhanded
remarks by current Supreme Court Justices denouncing the decision; and unending examples
of the popular belief that the decision was a mistake. See Eugene Gressman, Korematsu: A
Melange ofMilitary Imperaives,68 LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS. 15, 25 (2005). Which factors
are doing the real work here, and how? Is Korematsu suigeneais? Would anything short of
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This Article seeks to cut through the confusion and determine
when, if ever, history should counsel disregarding a prior wartime
case. It seeks to develop an operational framework for using history's
lessons, not only as rhetoric, but as part of stare decisis doctrine.
Importantly, this actually raises two distinct stare decisis questions.
Normally, discussion of the weight of stare decisis focuses on whether
some consideration, in this case history, can overcome the normal
presumption of stare decisis. But this Article asks a second, more
complicated question as well: whether history could ever keep the
presumption of stare decisis from attaching in the first place."
This Article begins by providing some background on each of
29 Yamashlita
those four cases discussed here: Quiin, 28 Eisentrager,
and Hirota Decided during or immediately following World War II,
all four raise questions about how history should judge the Court's
wartime record. Their common status as doctrinal orphans, decisions
neither truly precedented nor generally followed as precedent, allows
us to focus on the role history can and should play in determining their
weight, while ignoring any of the countervailing considerations that a
long line of consistent precedent might present." At the same time, the
facts of the four cases actually differ in important ways. A closer look
at the specific facts of each reveals a few different possible meanings
of the lessons of history, each with different potential roles to play in a
stare decisis analysis. Part II.A thus lays out the facts surrounding
such evidence suffice to strip a similar case of its authority? Whispers of Korematsus status
as "still good law" continue to crop up from time to time, see Aya Gruber, Raising the Red
Flag: The ContinuedRelevance of the JapaneseInternmentin the Post-Hamdi Worla4 54 U
KAN. L. REv. 307, 332 n. 138 (2006), and some have argued recently that whether Korematsu
was wrongly decided is an open question that historical hindsight cannot answer. See, e.g.,
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 113; RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 299 (2003) [hereinafter POSNER, LAw, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY];
RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION,

AND THE COURTS 171-73 (2001). Figuring out how history could overrule it is thus a serious
question.
27. This Article will generally only consider horizontal stare decisis, the extent to
which a future panel of a court is bound by the same court's prior decision. Additional policy
considerations make vertical stare decisis, or the extent to which future lower courts are
bound, more complicated. Some of the arguments made here could be applicable to that
context as well, but full consideration of how they would play out must be reserved for a
future article.
28. ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1 (1942).
29. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
30. In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
31.
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
32. Notably, this Article thus does not consider decisions like Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), whose authority has been buttressed by the lines of
precedent refining its meaning and testing its conclusions.
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each case, what the Court held in each decision, how those precedents
were treated by other courts prior to September 11, and finally, how
each has been handled by the Court in cases concerning terrorism and
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Part II.B looks more closely at
traditional notions of stare decisis and how they would treat the four
World War II decisions. This Part concludes that neither the traditional
reasons proffered for the policy of stare decisis nor the prevailing test
for when it might be abandoned prove particularly helpful in
determining the fate of these four decisions.
Part H1I asks whether the "lessons of history" might prove more
useful. As Part III.A recounts, many have argued that it does. But few
have been particularly clear about how those lessons should be used by
judges or when they might supersede an earlier precedent. In fact,
popular calls to learn the lessons of history tie a wide variety of
different types of arguments into one tightly wound knot. Part HI
seeks to disentangle the various strands and assess separately their
potential doctrinal relevance. After providing some background on the
use of history in law more generally in Part III.B, Part III.C divides
arguments about the relevance of history to these cases into three basic
models. Model 1 looks to the history of the cases themselves and
considers the role history may play in providing facts that complicate
or undermine the legitimacy of the court's opinions. Model 2
considers the role history might play as precedent-replacement. In this
model, the history pointed to is not the history of each case but instead
the subsequent history of reactions to the case. This Part explores the
role that subsequent judgments of Congress, the Executive, or others
might play when courts have largely remained silent. Finally, Model 3
considers the role history might play as a vehicle for constitutional
principles. Here, it is our (or more accurately, judges') current
assessments of the "meaning" of history that take center stage. In this
model, our assessment of the cases and their subsequent history
provide support or validation for our beliefs that the Constitution must
be protected from inevitable Executive aggrandizement in wartime or
that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact,' and that wartime
exceptions must be made. Each model is considered in light of the
costs and benefits of overriding stare decisis. The goal is to develop
clear, manageable models of history's use that can clarify the treatment
of these cases without unleashing the chaos and instability that
traditional stare decisis doctrine is meant to prevent.
Considering a number of variations on these three models and
applying them to the facts of Quinn, Eisentmger, Yamashita, and
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Hirota, Part 1I.D concludes that the doctrinal force of the lessons of
history is both narrower and broader than their proponents seem to
suggest.3 Where history raises specific questions about the facts of a
particular case (Model 1) or records a particular consensus on its
authority (Model 2), it seems reasonable to eliminate the presumption
of stare decisis altogether, essentially creating a blank slate for a new
Court. However, few, if any, wartime cases are likely to meet this
exacting standard. Broader understandings of the lessons of history
that seek to draw larger principles from a larger set of cases (Model 3)
may be more broadly applicable and may provide arguments for or
against overruling particular decisions, but these understandings will
have little more force than their general persuasiveness.
Although the discussion in this Article is limited to four specific
cases, this framework should be useful in considering a much broader
category of wartime cases. In time, some of today's terrorism cases
might merit such analysis. Another generation may be haunted by
Yaser Esam Hamdi, Shafiq Rasul, Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Lakhdar
Boumediene, or Mohammed Munaf3 Moreover, historical claims
have been made about mpny peacetime decisions, some undead and
some very much alive. Although the lessons learned in this Article are
not perfectly applicable to them, they should provide a useful starting
point for considering the role historical judgments might play more
generally.
I.

"GOOD WAR," QUESTIONABLE PRECEDENTS

Long dormant and largely forgotten, a series of World War H-era
decisions of the United States Supreme Court were reawakened
following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and
Pentagon. 5 In their efforts to construct and defend detention policies
for the War on Terror, the Bush Administration focused on four
precedents in particular: Ex parte Quiin, 6 In re Yamashita,3 7 Johnson
33. 317 U.S. 1; 339 U.S. 763; 327 U.S. 1; 338 U.S. 197.
34. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004);
Bounediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008); Munafv. Geren, 128 S.Ct. 2207 (2008).
35. For example, while the 2001 edition of Sullivan and Gunther's constitutional law
textbook does not even mention Qwhi, the 2007 version of the textbook, published after
September 11, features an excerpt from the opinion. Compare KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTnhTIONAL LAW (14th ed. 2001), with KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN &
GERALD GUNTHER, CONsTrrI~noNAL LAW 268 (16th ed. 2007). See Carlos M. Vdzquez, "Not
a Happy Precedent" The Story of Ex Parte Quirin, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 219-20
(Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik eds., 2010), discussing exclusion of Quin) inearly
editions of Federal Courts textbooks.
36. 317 U.S. 1.
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38 and Hirota v MacArthur39 This Part lays out some of
v Eisentrager,
the background of each case, the subsequent treatment of each
decision in other cases and scholarship, the ways in which the Bush
Administration relied on each decision, and the eventual treatment of
that claim by the Supreme Court.

A.

FourPrecedentsfrom the Past

1.

Exparte Quiiin

In June 1942, eight German would-be saboteurs landed in two
groups, one on Long Island and the other in Florida.4 ' After evading a
Coast Guardsman, the Long Island group shed their German uniforms
and buried them along with their explosives before slipping off to New
York City. The Florida group arrived undetected in bathing suits and
slipped off to various locations within the United States. At least two
of the men were U.S. citizens, and a number of them had questionable
loyalty to their mission.' One, George John Dasch, went so far as to
contact the FBI and warn it of the plot. Based on the information he
provided, the other seven were quickly rounded up and taken into
custody. The FBI, eager to claim credit for the arrests and afraid to
admit that the arrests occurred only with the help of one of the plotters,
buried Dasch's involvement.
Upon the advice of various officials, including Justice
Frankfurter, that a military commission would afford the President
greater flexibility in dictating procedures and rules of evidence than a
normal court martial, President Roosevelt ordered that all eight men,
including Dasch, be tried by a military commission made up of seven
generals with power to admit any evidence of "probative value to a
reasonable man" and to impose the death penalty based on a two-thirds

37. 327 U.S. 1.
38. 339 U.S. 763.
39. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
40. Vzquez, supm note 35, at 222-23.
41.
Id at 221. Another would-be plotter who was suspicious of Dasch's loyalty opted
not to join the plot. Burger apparently cooperated with Dasch's plot to turn himself in and
may have left clues as to the whereabouts of the uniforms and explosives. A third plotter,
Haupt, had a plausible story about joining the plot to escape Germany and return to the
United States. Id at 223.
42. Id at 222-23; Louis FISHER, NAZi SABOTEURS ON TRIAL: A MILrrARY TRIBUNAL
AND AMERCAN LAW 33-34 (2003). Interestingly, as late as 1956, the arrest of the plotters was
being attributed to "the alertness of a coastguardman and the thorough follow-up [by] the
FBI." Alpheus Thomas Mason, Inter Anna Silent Leges: ChiefJustice Stone s Views, 69
HARV. L. REv. 806, 813 (1956).
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vote." The order also precluded resort to the civil courts of the United
States.4
The eight men were charged with violations of the laws of war,
the Articles of War, and conspiracy. 4 On July 8, 1942, the trial before
the military commission began literally shrouded in secrecy-heavy
black drapes covered the windows of the room where the trial was
being held. 6
While the trial was proceeding, counsel for the men began to
consider seeking Supreme Court review of the constitutionality of the
military commission's authority4 They first sought permission from
the President to mount such a challenge, permission they were tepidly
granted.4 ' Defense counsel then reached out to Justice Roberts, who
convened a meeting with Justice Black, defense counsel, the
prosecutor, and Attorney General Biddle on July 23, 1942.4' The
Justices then consulted with as many other Justices as could be
reached by telephone."0 On July 27, the Court announced that it would
break its summer recess to hear arguments on July 29.' Popular
opinion, reflected in the newspapers of the day, was out for blood and
ill-disposed to the Supreme Court's decision." President Roosevelt
was also less than thrilled, telling Biddle: "I want one thing clearly
understood, Francis. I won't give them up ....I won't hand them
over to"~'US
' any United States marshal armed with a writ of habeas
53
corpus.15
The hearing took place on July 29, after testimony was finished
in the commission but before final arguments." One-hundred eighty
pages of briefs and the 3000-page transcript from the trial were
delivered to the Court that day. Justice Douglas, still travelling from
the West Coast, missed the first day. Justice Byrne sat for the
argument despite having already accepted a position in the Roosevelt
43. None of the generals had any legal training. Vdzquez, supranote 35, at 224-26.
44. Id. at 225.
45. Id.at 226.
46. Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 266; see also Mason, supra note 42, at
814 ("Trial by military commission commenced [on] July 8, in strict secrecy....").
47. Vizquez, supra note 35, at 227.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 228.
51.
Mason, supm note 42, at 815.
52. Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 266; Mason, supranote 42, at 815.
53. David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs' Case, 1 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 61, 68 (1996)
(alteration in original).
54. Vdzquez, supra note 35, at 229-30.
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Administration. Justice Murphy, in uniform as a reserve army officer,
recused himself on Justice Frankfurter's suggestion. It has been
suggested that Justice Frankfurter feared that the liberal Murphy might
side with the plotters. Evidence of how the plot was discovered was
not remarked upon during the hearing, perhaps because Dasch's
attorney had not filed a petition for habeas corpus or perhaps because
oral argument was open to the public.
Oral argument was conducted before the Court for approximately
nine hours, over the course of two days.5 At noon on July 3 1, less than
a day after arguments ended and in the middle of closing arguments in
the commission, the Court issued a per curiam opinion denying relief,
promising that a full opinion explaining their position would follow.
On August 1, closing arguments ended; on August 3, the commission
convicted the men and sentenced them to death; and on August 8, six
of the men (Dasch and Burger had their sentences commuted) were
executed. The Court's full opinion would not be issued for another
three months.
Writing the opinion under such circumstances turned out to be
more difficult than perhaps originally thought. Chief Justice Stone,
who had the responsibility of writing the opinion, described the
process as "a mortification of the flesh,' 5 and admitted that he found it
"very difficult to support the Government's construction of the articles
of war."57 Part of the problem was the timing. Having heard and
decided the case before the military commission verdict was
announced, any statement about the process for appealing the verdict
was arguably not ripe and should have been left an open question. Six
of the men had already been executed, however, rendering their future
arguments moot. Stone also had to deal with other restive Justices;
Justice Jackson had threatened to write a concurrence granting broad
power and discretion to the President, and Justice Frankfurter
distributed an imagined conversation between himself and the dead
saboteurs haranguing both the plotters for the audacity to petition for
the writ and the other Justices for considering the petition. In the end,
Justice Douglas expressed regret that the case had been decided
without a ready opinion, noting that "once ...the examination of the

grounds that had been advanced is made, sometimes those grounds

55.
56.
57.

Id.at 231-32.
Danelski, supm note 53, at 72.
V~zquez, supm note 35, at 232-34.
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crumble."58 And even Justice Frankfurter would later observe that
Quiin was "not a happy precedent."59
The full decision that the Court eventually released included a
number of important holdings. As an initial matter, the Court held that
notwithstanding the President's proclamation denying access to the
courts, enemy aliens have the right to challenge the statutory and
constitutional legality of their detention and trial.". In this case,
however, that challenge failed. The Court held that "to seize and
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to
thwart or impede our military effort have violated the law of war" is
"[a]n important incident to the conduct of war" and that "[b]y his
Order creating the present Commission[, the President] has undertaken
to exercise the authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also
such authority as the Constitution itself gives the Commander in
Chief."'" Where individuals, including citizens, are charged with
recognized violations of the laws of war (in this case, crossing military
lines out-of-uniform for the purpose of waging war), trial by military
commission is constitutional. The Court suggested off-handedly that it
was the absence of a law-of-war violation that distinguished Exparte
2 the Court's Civil War-era precedent suggesting that military
Milligan,"
commissions were unconstitutional while the civil courts remained
open. 63 The Court otherwise ignored the seemingly on-point
precedent, a point for which it has been criticized.6' The Court did not
decide whether the President could establish military commissions on
his authority, finding that by recognizing the possibility of military
commissions in article 15 of the Articles of War, Congress had
authorized them.65

58.
Id at 234 (quoting Transcriptions of Conversations between Justice William 0.
Douglas and Professor Walter E Murphy, Cassette No. 10: June 9, 1962 (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
59. Danelski, supra note 53, at 80 (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Memorandum,
Rosenberg v United States,June 4, 1953, Box 65, Frankfurter Pages, Harvard Law School).
60. ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
61.
Id at 28-29.
62.
Id.at 29, 46.
63.
71 U.S. 2 (1866).
64. See, e.g., Vdzquez, supra note 35, at 240 (discussing treatment of Milligan in
Quinn); Danelski, supra note 53, at 76 (summarizing arguments that Qubim gutted Milligan
without overturning it).
65.
Quirin,317 U.S. at 28. Article 15 declared:
[T]he provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts martial shall
not be construed as depriving military commissions ... or other military tribunals
of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by statute or by
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The Court relied on Quinn in In re Yamashita, to both uphold the
Japanese general's right to challenge his trial in the Philippines and to
uphold the legality of the military commission that tried him.6 Hirota
and Eisentragerwould both distinguish Qut to deny access to the
writ of habeas corpus.6 ' After World War n cases finally petered out,
citations to Quin still made their way into a smattering of Supreme
Court opinions, but usually to support the rule that Fifth and Sixth
Amendment jury rights are inapplicable to military trials." Other
cases cited Quin chiefly for secondary holdings or dicta." No
decision prior to September 11 cited it for the President's authority to
hold and try suspected enemies of the state without normal due

the law of war may be triable by such military commissions ... or other military
tribunals.
Id.at 27 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
66. 327 U.S. 1, 9, 20 (1946); see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 475 (2004) ("The
Court has, for example, entertained the habeas petitions ... of admitted enemy aliens
convicted of war crimes during a declared war and held in the United States .
(citing
Quitn)).
67. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 393 U.S. 763, 780 (1950) (citing Quifin) (holding that
Quin was distinguishable because in Quihn, the prisoners were held in D.C., arrested by
civil authorities, and charged at a time when civil courts functioned); Hirota v. MacArthur,
338 U.S. 197, 208 (1948) (citing Quidn) (distinguishing Quin because in Hirota the
President acted through an international tribunal).
68. See, e.g., Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 34 (1976) ("In Exparte Qufil, 317
U.S. 1, 40 (1942), it was said that 'cases arising in the land or naval forces' . . . are expressly
excepted from the Fifth Amendment, and are deemed excepted by implication from the
Sixth" (alteration in original)); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969) (quoting same
portion of Quirn); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957) (same); United States exrel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 37 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting) (same); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137,
152 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127
(1950) (same).
69. See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 246 (1998) ("[D]enial by the
district court of leave to file the petitions in these causes was the judicial determination of a
case or controversy, reviewable on appeal to the Court of Appeals." (quoting Quinn, 317 U.S.
at 24)); Walters v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 350-51 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) ("This Court has not hesitated to exercise this power of swift intervention in
cases of extraordinary constitutional moment and in cases demanding prompt resolution for
other reasons." (citing Quinn)); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 686 (1973) ("Moreover, a
military tribunal is an Article I legislative court with jurisdiction independent of the judicial
power created and defined by Article Ill."); Cousins v. Wigoda, 409 U.S. 1201, 1204 (1972)
(citing Quhin as rare example of the Court holding a Special Term); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 401-02 (1963) ("It is no accident that habeas corpus has time and again played a central
role in national crises, wherein the claims of order and of liberty clash most acutely, not only
in England in the seventeenth century, but also in America from our very beginnings, and
today." (footnote omitted) (citing Quida)); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
159-60 (1963) ("The powers of Congress to require military service for the common defense
are broad and far-reaching...." (citing Quthin)); Reia 354 U.S. at 5-6 ("The United States is
entirely a creature of the Constitution." (citing Quidm)).
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process rights." Courts of appeals and district court citations are
similar.7'
All of that changed after September 11. Quinn quickly became
the foundation stone of the Bush Administration's detention policy.72
In Quinn, the Administration found support for the detention of
American citizens as enemy combatants without trial or access to
counsel," broad presidential discretion to create military commissions
to try suspected terrorists without Fifth and Sixth Amendment
protections, the implicit congressional authorization of such
commissions, and even the implication that the President could create
such commissions against the wishes of Congress.74

These interpretations forced the Court to grapple with the
meaning of the Quhn precedent. In Hamdi v Rumsfel4 Justice
O'Connor, writing for a plurality of the Court, accepted the
70. The closest the Court comes are Reig 354 U.S. at 38-39 ("Moreover, it has not
yet been definitely established to what extent the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces, or his delegates, can promulgate, supplement or change substantive military
law as well as the procedures of military courts in time of peace, or in time of war."), and
Madsen v Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 355 (1952) ("'By thus recognizing military commissions
in order to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the
Articles, Congress gave sanction, as we held in Exparte Quin, to any use of the military
commission contemplated by the common law of war."' (quoting Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20)).
71.
See, e.g., Wright v. Markley, 351 F.2d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 1965) ("Military
tribunals are not governed by the procedure for trials prescribed in the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, including a trial by jury." (citing Quhin)); United States ex rel. Okenfus v.
Schulz, 67 E Supp. 528, 530 (S.D.N.Y 1946) ("The Sixth Amendment is not applicable to
courts-martial." (citing Qu'rin)); United States v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 E2d 369,
382 (7th Cir. 1945) ("' The Constitution thus invests the Presidentas Commander in Chief
with the power to wage war which Congresshas declared and to carry into effect all laws
passed by Congress for the conduct of war .... ' (quoting Quiiin, 317 U.S. at 26));
weightman v. United States, 142 F.2d 188, 191 (1st Cir. 1944) ("[T]he President, aside from
his ordinary peace-time powers, has power to take action with respect to conscientious
objectors...." (citing Quiin)); O'Callahan v. Chief U.S. Marshal, 293 E Supp. 441,442 (D.
Mass. 1966) ("[T]he statutory authorization to courts-martial is well within the constitutional
powers of the legislature." (citing Quinn)).
72. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel, to Attorney Gen. (June 8, 2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/
documents/memomilitarydetention06082002.pdf (discussing Qurh7 at length to support the
military detention without trial of Jose Padilla, an American citizen arrested in Chicago); 25
Op. Off. Legal Counsel 1, 6 Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try Terrorists
(2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2001/pub-millcommfinal.pdf (relying
primarily on Quinin to support President's creation of military commissions, implicit
congressional authorization of such commissions, and even implication that the President
could create such commissions against the wishes of Congress).
73.
See Bybee, supra note 72; see also Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 432 (2004)
("On the merits, the Government contended that the President has authority to detain Padilla
militarily pursuant to the Commander in Chief Clause of the Constitution, Art. 1I, § 2, cl. 1,
the congressional AUMF, and this Court's decision in Exparte Quin").
See 25 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, supra note 72, at 4, 6-10.
74.
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Administration's argument that the President was authorized by
Congress's Authorization of the Use of Military Force (AUMF) to
detain individuals as enemy combatants.75 Quoting Quirhf, Justice
O'Connor recognized that "[t]he capture and detention of lawful
combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful
combatants, by 'universal agreement and practice,' are 'important
incident[s] of war."'76 As such, "[I]n permitting the use of 'necessary
and appropriate force,' Congress has clearly and unmistakably77'
authorized detention in the narrow circumstances considered here.
Further citing Quinn, Justice O'Connor found that "[t]here is no bar to
this Nation's holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant." 8
In response to criticism of the Quhinn precedent, Justice O'Connor
answered:
Qu/in was a unanimous opinion. It both postdates and clarifies
Mligan,providing us with the most apposite precedent that we have on
the question of whether citizens may be detained in such circumstances.
Brushing aside such precedent-particularly when doing so gives rise
to a host of new questions never dealt with by this Court-is unjustified
and unwise."
At the same time, however, Justice O'Connor rejected Justice
Thomas's argument that Quinn granted the President broad
unreviewable authority over wartime detentions. 8 Softening the
potential meaning of Quirn, she found that regardless of the
President's authority to detain alleged enemy combatants, citizendetainees have a number of rights, and must be given "a fair
opportunity to rebut the Government's factual assertions before a
neutral decisionmaker."8'
In dissent, Justice Scalia went much further, questioning Justice
O'Connor's willingness to rely on Quinh at all.8" Justice Scalia
recalled the decision's unusual history and timing and remarked that
"[t]he case was not this Court's finest hour." 3 Justice Scalia also

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Haindi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004).
Id at 518 (second alteration in original) (quoting Quin, 317 U.S. at 28, 30).
Id at 519.
Id.
Id.
at 523.
Id at 587-88, 593 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id at 533 (majority opinion).
See id.
at 570 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id.
at 569.
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criticized that Court's treatment of M lig'an," a decision he felt better
captured the constitutional principles at issue.85
A more direct challenge to Quinn came two years later, as the
Court was forced to decide the constitutionality of the President's order
creating military commissions to try detainees in the War on Terroran order directly patterned off of Roosevelt's 1942 Proclamation.
Justice Stevens, writing for a majority of the Court in Hamdan, first
pointed to Quiin as support for choosing to consider the habeas
petition at issue in the case.86 Justice Stevens went on to accept the
Government's argument that, as in Quhin, Congress had implicitly
authorized the President to convene military commissions under
appropriate circumstances by using the same language in article 21 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) as had been used in
article 15 of the Articles of War." This was notwithstanding Justice
Stevens' description of Quhmn's characterization of article 15 of the
Articles of War as "controversial." 8 However, Justice Stevens rejected
the argument that Quinn provided "a sweeping mandate for the
President to 'invoke military commissions when he deems them
necessary.''89 Instead, Congress only authorized the President to
convene commissions where authorized by the "common law of war"
and in compliance with the rules laid down by Congress in the

84. See id at 570 (citing Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866)) ("Quitin purported to
interpret the language of Milligan.
); id.at 571 ("But even if Quiin gave a correct
description of Milligan...."); id at 572 n.4 ("The plurality's assertion that Quitin somehow
'clarifies' Milligan is simply false. As I discuss, the Quihn Court propounded a mistaken
understanding of Milligan...." (citations omitted)).
85. See id.at 567 n.1 ("Whatever Quinn's effect on Milligan's precedential value,
however, it cannot undermine its value as an indicator of original meaning.... Milligan
remains 'one of the great landmarks in this Court's history."' (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 30 (1957))).
Justice Souter took a different tack, arguing that if the government is to rely on Quirn as
authorization to invoke the laws of war it must also follow the laws of war regarding detainee
treatment. See id.
at 551 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
86. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 589 (2006). Justice Scalia disagreed, finding
that "[b]ecause Congress has created a novel unitary scheme of Article III review of military
commissions that was absent in 1942, Quirn is no longer governing precedent." Id.at 678
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
87. Id.at 592-93 (majority opinion) ("The provisions of this code conferring
jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or
offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by such military commissions,
provost courts, or other military tribunals." (quoting Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C § 821, art. 21 (2006))).
88. Id.at 593.
89. Id.(quoting Brief for Respondents at 17, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184)).
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UCMJ. Moreover, Justice Stevens hinted that the President had no
authority to act in contravention of Congress's wishes,9' a 180-degree
flip of the Government's reading of Quilin.92
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens went on to find
President Bush's military commission order inconsistent with the
UCMJ, which established a set of standards for such commissions
stricter than those in the World War II Articles of War.9 Writing for a
plurality, Justice Stevens held that the primary charge against Hamdan
(conspiracy), failed to meet Quinh's requirement of a law of war
violation recognized by "universal agreement and practice."94
Justice Thomas dissented, arguing that Quibn granted the
President broad discretion to define both procedures for, and law-ofwar offenses triable by, military commissions.9 5 The majority decision,
in his view, "is contrary to the presumption we acknowledged in
Quinn, namely, that the actions of military commissions are 'not to be
set aside by
the courts without the clear convicton that they are'
96
unlawful."
The Court's most recent statement on the Government detainee
policy, Boumediene,"7 took the marginalization of Quinn one step
further. Acknowledging that the Court in Quinn had limited its habeas
review to "only the lawful power of the commission to try the
petitioner for the offense charged" and not to "any question of the guilt
or innocence of petitioners," the Court linked that standard to the level
of process, full adversarial military trials, the petitioners had already

90. Id.at 593-94. Justice Kennedy agreed with this reading in his concurrence. Id. at
641 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If the military commission at issue is illegal under the law of
war, then an offender cannot be tried 'by the law of war' before that commission.").
91.
Id.at 593 n.23 (majority opinion) ("Whether or not the President has independent
power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on
his powers.").
92. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also supra note 72 and accompanying
text.
93. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620.
94. Id.at 603 (quoting Quuh7n 317 U.S. at 30) (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id at 689 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("However, 'charges of violations of the law of
war triable before a military tribunal need not be stated with the precision of a common law
indictment."' (quoting In rv Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 17 (1946))); id at 709 n.16 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]his Court's unequivocal interpretation of Article 21 [preserves] the commonlaw status of military commissions and the corresponding authority of the President to set
their procedures pursuant to his Commander in Chief powers.").
96. Id.at 690 (emphasis added by Hamdan Court) (quoting Quinin, 317 U.S. at 25).
97. Bourmediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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received." Having yet to receive such process, habeas review of the
Guantanamo detainees' petitions might be considerably broader."
2.

In re Yamashlita

The Court's next consideration of the legality of military
commissions did not come until after World War II was over. A few
weeks after Japan's surrender in September 1945, General Tomoyuki
Yamashita, Japan's military governor of the Philippines during the last
stages of the war in the Pacific, was arraigned before a military
commission of five American officers.'" He was charged with failing
to control the troops under his command as they committed an
assortment of atrocities during the chaotic weeks following General
MacArthur's return to the Philippines.'"' In December 1945, a military
commission convened by General MacArthur found Yamashita guilty
"upon secret written ballot, two-thirds or more of the members
concurring," " and sentenced him to death.' 3
After his petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines, Yamashita appealed to the US.
Supreme Court.'" As Justices Murphy and Rutledge would observe in
their vociferous dissents, Yamashita's trial was quite controversial and
raised numerous questions of basic fairness. ' First, there was
considerable question whether Yamashita could legitimately be held
liable for the atrocities that took place.' His troops had disobeyed his
orders to leave Manila, and it was unclear that Yamashita even knew of
the atrocities taking place. US. troops had cut Japanese communi98.

Id. at 2271 (quoting Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8; Quirnn7, 317 U.S. at 25) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
99.

Id.

100. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5; Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention,and
JudicialConscienceat War, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 99, 151 (2006).
101. Green, supra note 100, at 151.
102. Yamaslita, 327 U.S. at 51 n. 15 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also JOHN
M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY
RUTLEDGE 5 (2004).
103. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 618 (2006).

104.

Yamasluta, 327 U.S. at4.

105. Id. at 26 (Murphy, J. dissenting); id. at 41 (Rutledge, J. dissenting); see also
Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 618 ("[ Yamashita] generated an unusually long and vociferous critique

from two Members of this Court*"); Green, supra note 100, at 154 (describing Murphy's
dissent as "a fierce attack"); Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconst-uctingHirota: Habeas Corpus,
Citizenship, andArticle ID1, 95 GEO. L.J. 1497, 1508 (2007) ("Justices Murphy and Rutledge

each wrote separate, erudite, and angry dissents from the majority opinion.").
106.

Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 40 (Murphy, J., dissenting) ("The only conclusion I can

draw is that the charge made against the petitioner is clearly without precedent in
international law or in the annals of recorded military history.").
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cation lines, and officers who had actually participated in the atrocities
corroborated Yamashita's testimony that he had not known what was
happening in Manila.' °7 Further, three days before trial, charges related
to fifty-nine new atrocities were added to the sixty-four already
charged; no extra time was allowed to prepare additional defenses.' 8
Finally, the testimony of the 286 prosecution witnesses and the 423
prosecution exhibits were littered with hearsay.'" Following rules
promulgated by MacArthur that permitted the introduction "of
anything which in the commission's opinion 'would be of assistance in
proving or disproving the charge,' without any of the usual modes of
authentication," the commission allowed in "[e]very conceivable kind
of statement, rumor, report, at first, second, third or further hand,
written, printed or oral, and one 'propaganda' film.""' In the process,
the commission rejected defense objections "for nearly every kind of
defect under any of the usual prevailing standards for admissibility and
probative value," even "reprimand[ing] counsel for continuing to make
objection[s].""'
Despite these concerns, a majority of the Court voted to uphold
Yamashita's conviction."2 In an opinion by Chief Justice Stone, the
Court reaffirmed its holding in Quhl'2 that Congress had authorized
trial by military commission, even in a case like Yamashita's that took

107. Green, supranote 100, at 151. As Justice Murphy observed:
In other words, read against the background of military events in the
Philippines subsequent to October 9, 1944, these charges amount to this: "We, the
victorious American forces, have done everything possible to destroy and
disorganize your lines of communication, your effective control of your personnel,
your ability to wage war. In those respects we have succeeded. We have defeated
and crushed your forces. And now we charge and condemn you for having been
inefficient in maintaining control of your troops during the period when we were
so effectively besieging and eliminating your forces and blocking your ability to
maintain effective control. Many terrible atrocities were committed by your
disorganized troops. Because these atrocities were so widespread we will not
bother to charge or prove that you committed, ordered or condoned any of them.
We will assume that they must have resulted from your inefficiency and negligence
as a commander. In short, we charge you with the crime of inefficiency in
controlling your troops. We will judge the discharge of your duties by the
disorganization which we ourselves created in large part. Our standards of
judgment are whatever we wish to make them."
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 34-35 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
108. Id.at 57-58 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
109. Green, supm note 100, at 151.
110. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 49 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
111. Id.at 57-58.
112. Id.at 25.
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place after the fighting had ended."3 The Court further held that
Yamashita's alleged failure to control his troops was a cognizable
violation of the laws of war and that the evidentiary and procedural
rules laid out in the Articles of War and the Geneva Conventions were
inapplicable to him because the Articles of War applied only to trials of
American personnel and the Geneva Conventions applied only to trials
for crimes committed after capture."4 Most notably, the Court held
that it could consider only the lawfulness of the military commission's
authority to try Yamashita: "If the military tribunals have lawful
authority to hear, decide and condemn, their action is not subject to
judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision on
disputed facts."' 5
Justices Murphy and Rutledge each wrote angry dissents."6 Both
argued that the Fifth Amendment right to due process applied to
Yamashita's trial and detailed ways in which that right had been
violated. Justice Rutledge lambasted the Court for accepting in
Yamashita's commission "a power so unrestrained to deal with any
human being through any process of trial,""'7 and Justice Murphy
intimated that Yamashita was the victim of heightened emotions and a
desire to avenge Japanese atrocities."8
Although cited in a few other World War 11 cases, in particular,
9 few cases prior to September 11 mentioned
Johnson v Eisenager,"
Yamashita. Between 1951 and 2001, the Supreme Court cited
113. Id.at7-12, 12-13.
114. Id.at 15-17, 19-20, 22-23 (citing Articles of War, 10 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1593
(1946); Geneva Convention art. 60, July 27, 1929,47 Stat. 2021).
115. Id.
at 8.
116. See Green, supra note 100, at 154 (describing Murphy's dissent as a "fierce
attack"); Vladeck, supm note 105, at 1508 (characterizing dissents as "angry").
117. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 81 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting).
118. See id.at 29 (Murphy, J.,
dissenting) ("If we are ever to develop an orderly
international community based upon a recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost
importance that the necessary punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible
from the ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness. Justice must be tempered by compassion
rather than by vengeance.").
119. 339 U.S. 763,781, 783, 786-87, 790, 794-95, 797 (1950); see alsoHiatt v. Brown,
339 U.S. 103, 111 (1950); Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 696-97 (1949) (citing
Yamashita for proposition that courts cannot decide guilt or innocence of those convicted by
court-martial); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 201-02, 208-09 (1948) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("If no United States court can inquire into the lawfulness of his detention, the
military have acquired, contrary to our traditions, a new and alarming hold on us." (citation
omitted) (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1)); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S.
258, 343 (1947) ("No man or group is above the law." (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 41
(Rutledge, J., dissenting))); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313 (1946) (citing
Yamashita as evidence of "well-established" military battlefield jurisdiction); Homma v.
Patterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946). Homma was a companion case to Yamashita.
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Yamashita only five times and only once after 1955. 20' Most often, the

case was cited as one of a string of cases distinguishing habeas
jurisdiction and appellate review"' The only post-Eisentragercase
citing Yamashita for one of its core holdings, namely, that the
President's authority to establish military commissions in occupied
territory may sometimes survive the cessation of hostilities, is Madsen
v Kisella a 1953 case involving the trial of an American
serviceman's wife for a murder committed in Allied-occupied
Germany.'22 District and appellate court citations to the cases are also
buried in string-cites, are similarly rare, and are similarly focused on
the nature of habeas jurisdiction.'23
After September 11, Yamashita became part of the Bush
Administration's legal justification of trials by military commission,
playing something of a second-fiddle role to the more important

120. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 750 (1975) (recognizing that civil
courts cannot review acts of a court martial and "acknowledging the special constitutional
status of that writ under the Suspension Clause"); United States ex rel.Toth v. Quarles, 350
U.S. 11, 13-14 (1955) ("The 1950 Act cannot be sustained on the constitutional power of
Congress 'To raise and support Armies,' 'To declare War,' or to punish 'Offences against the
Law of Nations."' (citing Yarmashita, 327 U.S. 1)); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 485 (1953)
(citing Yamasuta for proposition that habeas corpus cannot be used in lieu of appeal); Bums
v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 139 (1953) (citing Yamashita for proposition that federal courts have
habeas jurisdiction over prisoners sentenced to death in proceedings where they were denied
basic rights); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348-49, 352, 355 (1952) (citing Yamashita
for proposition that military commissions are constitutional and can outlast hostilities).
121. See, e.g., Schlesinger,420 U.S. at 746, 751; Brown, 344 U.S. at 485; Bums, 346
U.S. at 139. Less clearly, in UnitedStates ex iel. Toth v Quarles, 350 U.S. at 13-14, the Court
cites Yamashita in a footnote to the sentence: "The 1950 Act cannot be sustained on the
constitutional power of Congress 'To raise and support Armies,' 'To declare War,' or to punish
'Offences against the Law of Nations.'
122. See Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348-49, 352, 355 ("His authority to do this sometimes
survives cessation of hostilities."); see also id at 355 ("The jurisdiction exercised by our
military commissions in the examples previously mentioned extended to nonmilitary crimes,
such as murder and other crimes of violence, which the United States as the occupying power
felt it necessary to suppress. In the case of n re Yamashita, following a quotation from
Article 15, this Court said, 'By thus recognizing military commissions in order to preserve
their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles, Congress
gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quwin, to any use of the military commission
contemplated by the common law of war."' (citation omitted) (quoting Yamashita, 327 U.S. at
20)).
123. See, e.g., Williams v. Heritage, 323 F.2d 731, 732 (5th Cir. 1963); Fischer v.
Ruffner, 277 E2d 756, 758 (5th Cir. 1960); Shaver v. Ellis, 255 E2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1958);
Bisson v. Howard, 224 E2d 586, 589 (5th Cir. 1955); Burns v. Lovett, 202 F2d 335, 339 (D.C.
Cir. 1952); Schilder v. Gusik, 195 E2d 657, 659 (6th Cir. 1952). A couple of more recent
cases cite Yamashita on command responsibility. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 E3d
767, 777 (9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadlid, 70 F3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Quiuin.12 1 In particular, the Administration argued that Yamashita

recognized that the trial of enemy combatants was a fundamental
incident of war and that as a result the President was authorized to
establish military commissions by Congress's Authorization of the Use
of Military Force (AUMF).' 21 It also suggested that Yamashita
counseled judicial deference to the Executive in the establishment of
such commissions.126
Confronted with the precedent in Hamdan, the Court
significantly reduced its relevance. 27' Although the Court noted that
Yamashita recognized the use of military commissions, it presented
that precedent as a limitation on that power rather than as a broad
grant. The Court emphasized that the power to create military
commissions recognized in Yamashita "can derive only from the
'
powers granted jointly to the President and Congress in time of war," 28
and despite Yamashita's controversial holding on the laws of war, a
plurality cited it for a requirement that military commission charges
accurately state violations of the laws of war and found, that the
"conspiracy" charge against Hamdan failed to meet that test. 29'
Moreover, although the Court did not overrule Yamas&l4ta, Justice
Stevens, who had clerked for Justice Rutledge, 131 used the dissents in
that case to paint the precedent in a decidedly negative light. Writing
for the majority, he referred to the Yamashita Court's ruling as
"notorious,"' 3 ' and noted that "[tihe procedures and rules of evidence
employed during Yamashita's trial departed so far from those used in
courts-martial that they generated an unusually long and vociferous
critique from two Members of this Court " 32
' More importantly, he
124. 25 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, 1 Legality of the Use of Military Commissions To Try
Terrorists (2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/2001/pub-millcommfmal.pdf (relying
principally on Quhin, but citing Yamashita for proposition that it "[a]uthoriz[es] the use of
military commissions to enforce the laws of war").
125. See Brief for Respondents at 16, 19, 21, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006) (No. 05-184).

126. See id.at 13 ("Because the Military Order applies to alien enemy combatants
who are captured during the ongoing war with al Qaeda, both the traditional deference this
Court pays to the military justice system and the vital role played by that system are at their
pinnacle." (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 11)).
127. Hamdan,548 U.S. 557.
128. Id at591.
129. Id.at 599. But see id at 681 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Yamashfta
preserves presidential authority to prescribe rules and procedures for military commissions
and mandates deference to executive interpretations of the laws of war).
130. Green, supmnote 100, at 112.
131. Hamdan,548 U.S. at 620.
132. Id at 618.
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observed that criticism of the Yamashita trial had led to changes in
both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions that "seriously
undermined" YamasWka's holding on evidentiary standards and
"stripped [it] of its precedential value."'33
3.

Hirota v MacArthur

Hirota v MacArthur is perhaps the most obscure of these
decisions: it has some of the oddest facts, its holding is difficult to
discern, and it has been invoked most rarely.'" In Hirota, the Court
considered petitions for a writ of habeas corpus brought by Baron
Koki Hirota, a former Japanese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister,
and six other Japanese citizens who had been convicted by the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), the Japanese
counterpart to the Nuremberg tribunal.'35 Hirota, the only civilian
sentenced to death by the tribunal, was convicted for his involvement
in the war against China and "complicity in the Rape of Nanking."'36
He had retired from public service before the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor.'37
Hirota brought his petition under the Court's original jurisdiction,
an unusual form of relief that had not been granted since 1925 and had
only been granted three times since 1891, 3 but that was requested by
hundreds of Japanese and Germans convicted by war crimes tribunals
following World War H." Each of the dozens of petitions brought by
German nationals prior to H-rotahad been rejected without opinion by
4-4 votes; Justice Jackson, who had been chief prosecutor at
Nuremberg, recused himself from each decision." ° Only for Hirota did
Justice Jackson choose to vote for hearing the petition. Four judges
dissented from the decision to schedule an argument on the merits. It
is not clear what changed with Hirota. The Court may have been
swayed by Justice Rutledge, who had threatened to file an opinion
shaming the court if it failed to hear the petition. At the same time,
133. Id.at 618, 620.
134. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
135. Vladeck, supranote 105, at 1499.
136. Id at 1500.
137. Id at 1515.
138. Id at 1511.
139. Id at 1500. For a comprehensive discussion of the mechanism and the specific
doctrinal circumstances that made it suddenly popular following World War II, see generally
Vladeck, supm note 105.
140. Idat1510-11.
141. Id.at 1515-16.
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Hirotawas the first petition brought by Japanese rather than German
citizens and thus a degree removed from Jackson's participation at
Nuremberg.' 2 When it became clear after the argument that his vote
was no longer needed to break the tie, Justice Jackson again recused
himself. "'3 Justice Douglas recorded his concurrence with the
majority's decision to deny the petition, promising an opinion that
would arrive six months after that of the rest of the Court.'" Justice
Murphy dissented without an opinion. Justice Rutledge reserved his
vote, but died before recording it.'"
The rest of the Court issued a three-paragraph, nine-sentence per
curiam opinion.'46 It is hard to derive a clear rule from the decision.
The per curiam reads like a list of facts militating against granting the
writ without any clear indication of which, if any, were decisive:
The petitioners, all residents and citizens of Japan, are being held in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a military tribunal in Japan. Two
of the petitioners have been sentenced to death, the others to terms of
imprisonment. They filed motions in this Court for leave to file
petitions for habeascorpus. We set all the motions for hearing on the
question of our power to grant the relief prayed and that issue has now
been fully presented and argued.
We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a
tribunal of the United States. The United States and other allied
countries conquered and now occupy and control Japan. General
Douglas MacArthur has been selected and is acting as the Supreme
Commander for the Allied Powers. The military tribunal sentencing
these petitioners has been set up by General MacArthur as the agent of
the Allied Powers.
Under the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States
have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the
judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners and for this
reason the motions
for leave to file petitions for writs of habeas corpus
47
are denied.

The Court heard no further original petitions related to war crimes
tribunals. As Stephen Vladeck explains, the number of Japanese and
German prisoners in U.S. custody diminished rapidly after the case,
and Eisentrageies subsequent holding that convicted enemy war
142. Id at 1515.
143. Id at 1517-18.
144. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197, 199 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring); see
Vladeck, supm note 105, at 1522.
145. Vladeck,supra note 105, at 1508, 1517.
146. H-ot, 338 U.S. at 197-98.
147. Id at 198.

HeinOnline -- 84 Tul. L. Rev. 981 2009-2010

982

TULANE LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 84:957

criminals outside the United States 4had
no constitutional right of
8
habeas rendered such petitions useless.
Between Eisentragerv Johnsonand September 11, the Hirotaper
curiam was cited only once by the Supreme Court, and then only for
the proposition that "[i]t has been assumed that this Court has no
jurisdiction to issue an original writ of habeas corpus except when
issuance of the writ has been first denied by a lower court.... [T]he
Court has not settled the question.""' 9 Citations to the case in district
and circuit court opinions are also rare between 1951 and 2001 and
usually appear only as a potential gloss on the rule from Ahrens v
Clarkthat habeas petitioners must file their petitions in the district in
which they are being confined. 5° Additionally, a few decisions point to
Hirota as analogous to cases concerning nonreviewable decisions
made by foreign governments or courts.'5'
But Hirotasuddenly became more relevant during the war in Iraq.
Two American citizens, Shawqi Omar and Mohammad Munaf, were
detained in Iraq by American forces operating under U.N. mandate as
part of Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I).'52 Both petitioned for writs
of habeas corpus to enjoin their transfer to Iraqi authorities, who the
petitioners alleged might torture them. The Bush Administration
argued that MNF-I was an international force and that H-ota
precluded federal court jurisdiction when the petitioners were being
held by an international body. The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit, parsing the language of the Hirotaper
curiam, distinguished Omar's petition and found jurisdiction based on
the fact that Omar, unlike Hirota had not yet been "convicted" by a
non-U.S. court.' 3 Because Munaf had already been convicted by an
148. Vladeck, supm note 105, at 1525-26.
149. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 48 n.1 (1972). Justice Douglas's concurrence
was cited in one other case as part of a cf cite to the proposition that "[w]here American
citizens confined overseas (and thus outside the territory of any district court) have sought
relief in habeas corpus, we have held, if only implicitly, that the petitioners' absence from the
district does not present a jurisdictional obstacle to the consideration of the claim." Braden v.
30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 498 (1973).
150. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); see, e.g., United States exrel. Meadows v.
New York, 426 E2d 1176, 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1970); Word v. North Carolina, 406 E2d 352,
358-59, 363 (4th Cir. 1969); Kinnell v. Warner, 356 E Supp. 779, 781 (D. Haw. 1973); United
States ex re. Lohmeyer v. Laird, 318 F Supp. 94, 97 (D. Md. 1970); Varallo v. Ohio, 312 E
Supp. 45,47 (E.D. Tex. 1970).
151. Eg., Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 E2d 1179, 1195 (2d Cir. 1980); Standard-Vacuum
Oil Co. v. United States, 153 F Supp. 465,466 (Ct. Cl. 1957); United States v. Sinclair, 702 E
Supp. 477, 479 (D. Del. 1989).
152. Munafv. Geren, 482 F.3d 582, 582-83 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
153. Omar v. Harvey, 479 E3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
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Iraqi court, however, the D.C. Circuit found Hrota controlling and
determined that it lacked jurisdiction.'" The Supreme Court took a
different view. The Court neither clarified the exact meaning of Hirota
nor overruled it; instead the Court found the earlier decision irrelevant
to Omar and Munaf's petitions. 5 ' Focusing on the language of the
habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(1),(3), which "provides that a
federal district court may entertain a habeas application by a person
held 'in custody under or by color of the authority of the United
States,"' the Court found that Omar and Munaf were by the administration's own admission held "under ... the authority of the United
States"'5 As the Court explained, regardless of the formal status of
MNF-I, "The United States acknowledges that Omar and Munaf are
American citizens held overseas in the immediate 'physical custody' of
American soldiers who answer only to an American chain of
command.""' For good measure, the Court also noted that Omar and
58
Munaf differed from Hirota in their status as American citizens.
Exactly what Hirota means and whether its holding is still relevant
would thus have to wait for another day.
4.

Johnson v Eisentager

The last of the four cases to reach the Supreme Court was
Johnson v Eisentrager 9 Eisentzager involved twenty-one German
nationals who had been captured in China, convicted by an American
military commission there for violating the laws of war, and
subsequently sent to Landsberg Prison in Germany to serve their
sentences.'"0 Noting that the case "requires us to consider questions
basic to alien enemy and kindred litigation which for some years have
been beating upon our doors," Justice Jackson, writing for the majority,
rejected the petitions.' The opinion runs through a list of reasons to
reject them. First, notes Jackson, "We are cited to no instance where a
court, in this or any other country where the writ is known, has issued
it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage
154. Muna,, 482 E3d at 583. By the time the case was heard by the Supreme Court,
however, Munaf's conviction had been vacated. Harlan Grant Cohen, International
Decisions: Munaf v. Geren, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 854, 855 (2008).
155. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2218 (2008).
156. Id.at 2216 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(1), (3) (2006)).
157. Id.
158. Id at 2218.
159. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
160. Id at 765-66.
161. Id. at 768.
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of his captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction."' 62 Jackson
then goes on to discuss the various ways in which aliens, enemy aliens,
and citizens have historically been treated differently for constitutional
purposes.' He explains that the alien "has been accorded a generous
and ascending scale of rights as he increases his identity with our
society," and that previous cases granting resident aliens the same
rights as citizens dealt specifically with aliens within U.S. territory."
Nonresident enemy aliens, he observes, have generally received fewer
rights and have not been granted access to U.S. courts during wartime,
and "these prisoners at no relevant time were within any territory over
which the United States is sovereign, and the scenes of their offense,
their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States."' 65
But he continues on to explain the practical difficulties with
granting these petitioners the writ. He observes that the question here
is whether the writ constitutionally applies to a "prisoner of our
military authorities" who
(a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United States;
(c)was captured outside of our territory and there held in military
custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military
Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses against
laws of war committed outside the United
States; (f) and is at all times
6
imprisoned outside the United States.'

1

To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army
must transport them across the seas for hearing. This would require
allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations.
It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners
desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend
legality of the sentence. The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right,
would be equally available to enemies during active hostilities as in the
present twilight between war and peace. Such trials would hamper the
war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy. They would
diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but
with wavering neutrals. It would be difficult to devise more effective
fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is
ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil
courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id
Id.
at 769-76.
Id.
at 770.
Id.
at 778.
Id at 777.
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abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result
of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and
military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.'67

Jackson also observes that granting habeas rights would most likely
not result in reciprocal treatment since few other states even have such
a writ.
Finally, Jackson considers the substance of their petition,
rejecting both their claims under various treaties and the Fifth
Amendment. The Fifth Amendment specifically excludes American
servicemen from coverage; it would be highly anomalous to provide
that coverage to enemy servicemen.'6 9 Beyond that, Jackson finds no
basis for their complaint that the military commission lacked
jurisdiction to try them.'70 In the end, Jackson's laundry list of reasons
to reject the petitions left the exact holding of the decision difficult to
discern.' 7'

Unlike the other three cases discussed in this Article, the
Court's'72 first sustained attempt to grapple with the true meaning of
167. Id.at 778-79.
168. Id.at 779.
169. Id.at 783.
170. Id. at 790 ("We are unable to find that the petition alleges any fact showing lack
of jurisdiction in the military authorities to accuse, try and condemn these prisoners or that
they acted in excess of their lawful powers.').
171. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem ofJuisdictionalNon-Preceden444 TULSA
L. REV. 587 (2009) (describing the dissenters' confusion over the majority opinion's
meaning).
172. Although cited by the Court fleetingly in a few cases, none of those cases relied
on Eisentrage's central holding or holdings regarding the fights of extraterritorial enemy
prisoners; most cited the decision solely for stray language on tangentially related topics.
See, e.g., Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (citing Eisentragerfor proposition that
an alien's constitutional status changes when he gains admission and develops permanent ties
to United States); Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1981) (citing Eisentrager
regarding statutory interpretation)); Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934, 938 (1967) (Douglas,
J., dissenting) (citing Eisentrager for Judiciary's unwillingness to challenge Executive
wartime decisions); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1965) (Brenner, J.,
dissenting) ("To succeed, the addressees would then have to establish their standing to
vindicate the senders' constitutional rights as well as First Amendment protection for political
propaganda prepared and printed abroad by or on behalf of a foreign government." (citation
omitted) (citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 781-85)); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1957) ("This
Court and other federal courts have held or asserted that various constitutional limitations
apply to the Government when it acts outside the continental United States."); Bums v.
Wilson, 346 U.S. 844, 851-52 (1953) (citing Eisentrager in string cite on "whether an
American citizen detained by federal officers outside of any federal judicial district, may
maintain habeas corpus directed against the official superior of the officers actually having
him in custody"). Citations from lower courts prior to Verdugo-Urquidez are similar, though
some do rely on the decision in rulings regarding extraterritorial constitutional rights. See,
e.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 952 (5th Cir. 1979) ("[N]ot only is United
States citizenship a 'high privilege,' it is a priceless treasure.' (quoting Eisentrager,339 U.S.
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the Eisentragerholding came before September 11 in the 1990 case
United States v Verdugo-Urquidez. In that case, the Court was
forced to consider whether Fourth Amendment warrant protections
applied to a search done in Mexico in connection with the American
trial of a Mexican national. The Court split over Eisentmgeis
meaning. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, found
Eisentager "emphatic" in its holding that aliens abroad were not
protected by the Fifth Amendment. 7' Justice Kennedy, concurring in
the holding, further noted the distinction drawn in Eisentragerbetween
citizens and aliens.' Justice Brennan, however, dissenting from the
holding, thought Rehnquist had "mischaracterize[d]" Eisentmge's
holding.'76 By his reading, the Court in Eisentragerhadheld that "[ilt
is war that exposes the relative vulnerability of the alien's status."'"
"The Court rejected the German nationals' efforts to obtain writs of
habeas corpus not because they were foreign nationals, but because
they were enemy soldiers."'78
Verdugo-Urquidezthus gave new life and possibly new meaning
to Eisentrager Following Verdugo-Urquidez, a number of circuit
courts cited the two cases together for the proposition that some Bill of
Rights protections did not apply to aliens abroad.' 9 But it was the war
at 791 (Black, J., dissenting))); Silva v. Bell, 605 E2d 978, 984 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing
Eisentrageron "case or controversy" requirement for class standing); Reyes v. Sec'y of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 476 E2d 910, 915 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (citing Eisentagerfor
proposition that the United States Constitution's application is limited to U.S. territories);
Davi v. Laird, 318 E Supp. 478, 483 (WD. Va. 1970) (citing Eisentragerfor proposition that
courts should defer to Executive in foreign affairs).
173. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
174. Id. at 270. Rehnquist also found Justice Jackson's practical concerns in
Eisentragercompelling and reasoned that similar considerations militated against applying
the Fourth Amendment in Verdugo-Urquidez. Id. at 273.
175. Id. at 276.
176. Id at 290.
177. Id (quoting Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 771 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. Id. at 291.
179. See, e.g., Harbury v. Deutsch, 233 F3d 596, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing
Eisentragerinrefusing an extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment to noncitizens);
United States v. Gecas, 120 E3d 1419, 1430 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Eisenftager for
proposition that the Court "has refused to apply ... procedural protections ... to our
government's treatment of foreign citizens in foreign countries"); Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v.
Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1428 (11 th Cir. 1995) (citing Eisentrageras"emphatic" rejection
of extraterritorial reach of Fifth Amendment); Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d
1326, 1343 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Eisentragerfor proposition that "the Court has rejected the
claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside sovereign territory" (quoting
Verdugo-Urquidez 494 U.S. at 269)); Ashkir v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 438, 441-42, 443
(Fed. Cl. 2000) ("Moreover, in Johnson, the Supreme Court recognized that any analysis of
the limited extraterritoriality of the criminal protections of the Fifth Amendment was
extendable to the entire Bill of Rights." (citing Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 784)).
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in Afghanistan and the decision to house detainees captured there and
elsewhere in the world in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, that put the holding
in Eisentrager squarely in focus. In a series of cases, the Bush
Administration argued that the detainees had no right to challenge their
status as enemy combatants in US. courts and that Eisentrager
precluded jurisdiction over the detainees' habeas petitions.
In Rasul, both the D.C. District Court and Court of Appeals
agreed that Eisentragerprecluded jurisdiction over habeas petitions
brought by aliens held abroad.' ° Writing for a majority of the
Supreme Court, Justice Stevens disagreed. Eisentager,he explained,
looked only at whether habeas jurisdiction would be constitutionally
required in the absence of a statutory grant of jurisdiction.'8 ' Based on
their prior decision in Ahrens, the Court assumed that a district court
only had statutory authority over habeas petitions when the petitioners
were located within that court's territorial jurisdiction.'82 Accordingly,
the Court looked only at whether the Eisentragerpetitioners, then held
in Germany, were constitutionally guaranteed the writ. Ahrens,
however, had been overruled by a later decision, Braden v 30th
JudicialCircuit Cour4 which held that it was the custodian's, and not
the petitioner's, presence in the court's territorial jurisdiction of the
court that mattered for jurisdiction under the habeas statute. 183
"Because Braden overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentageis
holding'" Justice Stevens explained, "Eisentqger plainly does not
184
preclude the exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over petitioners' claims.'
For good measure, though, Justice Stevens hinted that Eisentrageis
constitutional holding was also irrelevant to the Guantanamo
detainees' petitions, noting that Justice Jackson listed six facts
"crucial" to his rejection of jurisdiction in Eisentager,most of which
were not true of the Guantanamo detainees:
They are not nationals of countries at war with the United States, and
they deny that they have engaged in or plotted acts of aggression
against the United States; they have never been afforded access to any
tribunal, much less charged with and convicted of wrongdoing; and for

180. Rasul v.Bush, 542 U.S. 466,472-73 (2004).
181. Idat476.
182. Id at 476-78 (citing Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 192 (1948)). Note that as
with Yamashta Ahrens provoked a dissent from the judge Justice Stevens once clerked for,
Wiley Rutledge. As in Hamdan,Stevens uses the opportunity of writing the majority opinion
in Rasulto breathe new life into Rutledge's dissent. See Green, supm note 100, at 114.
183. Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct., 410 U.S. 484,495 (1973).
184. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479.
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more than two years they have been imprisoned in territory over which
the United States exercises exclusive jurisdiction and control.'85

Justice Kennedy expanded on this hint in his concurrence.

6

For

Justice Kennedy, Jackson's multifactored analysis in Eisentrager

reflected a careful attempt to manage the separation of powers and to
balance judicial review and executive authority.'
Different situations
8
will warrant a different balance; based on the totality of factors in

Eisentrager,the Court found judicial involvement through the writ
inappropriate.' 9 For Justice Kennedy, the situation in Rasul, however,
was markedly different in at least two important ways: "First,
Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory,
and it is one far removed from any hostilities.""'9 Second, whereas the
Eisentragerpetitioners had already had an opportunity to challenge

their detention in a trial before a military commission, the Rasul
petitioners had not been given any opportunity to challenge their
indefinite detention or their status as enemy combatants-a status they
contested.'' For Kennedy, these two facts shifted the balance in favor
of judicial involvement.9
Justice Scalia found both Justice Stevens' and Justice Kennedy's

reading of Eisentrager"implausible in the extreme."' 93' As he read it,
Eisentragerspecifically rejected application of the habeas statute to
aliens held abroad, a holding Bradendid nothing to disturb, and held as

a constitutional matter "that aliens abroad didnot have habeas corpus
185. Id.at 476.
186. Kennedy rejected Stevens' argument about the relationship between Bmden and
Eisentrager. Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he Court's approach is not a plausible
reading of Bmden or Johnson v. Eisentrager.").
187. See id. at 485-86 ("Eisentragerconsideredthe scope of the right to petition for a
writ of habeas corpus against the backdrop of the constitutional command of the separation
of powers.").
188. See id. at 487 ("[F]aithful application of Eisentrager,then, requires an initial
inquiry into the general circumstances of the detention to determine whether the Court has
the authority to entertain the petition and to grant relief after considering all of the facts
presented.").
189. Id at 486 ("Because the prisoners in Eisentragerwere proven enemy aliens found
and detained outside the United States, and because the existence of jurisdiction would have
had a clear harmful effect on the Nation's military affairs, the matter was appropriately left to
the Executive Branch and there was no jurisdiction for the courts to hear the prisoner's
claims.").
190. Id.at 487.
191. 1dat488.
192. See id ("In light of the status of Guantanamo Bay and the indefinite pretrial
detention of the detainees, I would hold that federal-court jurisdiction is permitted in these
cases.").
193. Id.at 489 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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rights."'9 By Justice Scalia's reading, the majority and concurrence
did not interpret or distinguish Eisentager,they overruled it.'95 Worse
still, "[T]he Court springs a trap on the Executive, subjecting
Guantanamo Bay to the oversight of the federal courts even though it
has never before been thought to be within their jurisdiction-and9 6thus
making it a foolish place to have housed alien wartime detainees.'
Either way, Justice Stevens' majority opinion did nothing to
disturb Eisentrage'sconstitutional holding, whatever it might be. That
question was soon presented to the Court after Congress intervened to
remove statutory habeas jurisdiction. In Boumedene, Justice Kennedy
expanded his multifactor, separation of powers, balancing analysis.'97
For Kennedy, Eisentzager did not represent a formal rule denying
constitutional habeas protection to aliens held outside the sovereign
territory of the United States.' 8 Instead, Kennedy focuses on other
"authoritative" language of Eisentragerthatsuggested a functional test
based on practical considerations. ' Noting the factors listed by
Jackson in Eisentmger,Kennedy finds:
[A]t least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the
Suspension Clause: (1)the citizenship and status of the detainee and
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination
was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then
detention took place; and (3)the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ. 2°°
Kennedy concludes that the Guantanamo detainees, whose status
as enemy combatants was disputed and not yet been fully adjudicated
and who were housed in territory far from the battlefield and subject to
the United States de facto sovereignty and plenary control, have a
constitutional right to habeas corpus.'

194. Id. at 502. He also found any distinction between U.S. control over Landsberg
and U.S. control over Guantanamo untenable. Id at 500.
195. See id at 497 ("The reality is this: Today's opinion, and today's opinion alone,
overrules Eisentrager.. .
196. Id at 497-98.
197. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
198. See id. at 2236 ("A constricted reading of Eisentrageroverlooks what the Court
sees as a common thread uniting all these cases: The idea that extraterritoriality questions
turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.").
199. Id at 2257-58 ("Practical considerations weighed heavily as well in Johnson v
Eisentrager... ?'). Kennedy finds such a functional interpretation of Eisentiagertobe more
in line with the Insular Cases which preceded it and Reid v Covertwhich followed it. Id.
200. Id.at 2259.
201. ldat2260-62.
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Justice Scalia, again in dissent, thoroughly rejected this reading.
The Administration had "relied on our settled precedent in Johnson v
Eisentrager,when he established the prison at Guantanamo Bay for
enemy aliens," and had good reason to do so: "Eisentragercould not
be clearer that the privilege of habeas corpus does not extend to aliens
abroad. By blatantly distorting Eisentrager,the Court avoids the
difficulty of explaining why it should be overruled."" 2
Regardless of whether Justice Scalia was right, doctrinally
Eisentragerremained good law after Boumedene, and lower courts
have applied it as such. In a case involving the potential release of
detainees into the United States, the D.C. Circuit found the Fifth
Amendment inapplicable to the Guantanamo detainees on the strength
of Eisentragei'sprecedent." 3
B.

StareDecisis

Stare decisis is the "[p]olicy of courts to stand by precedent and
not to disturb settled point[s]."2 " For inferior courts, that policy is a
binding rule. Lower courts must follow the rules laid out in the
decisions of higher courts. For future panels of the same court, the
effect of stare decisis is less clear, but it operates at the very least as a
strong presumption. "Stare decisisis not an inexorable command," the
United States Supreme Court has explained, but it is "the preferred
course" and "usually the wise policy. 2 5 Although stare decisis has
become quite controversial of late, particularly with regard to
constitutional cases, 2" it remains today, as it was in Benjamin
Cardozo's time, "at least the everyday working rule of our law."' 7 The
presumption in any given case is that prior precedents should be
followed. And so it was with each of the four World War H-era cases
202. Id at 2294, 2302 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) ("[T]he great weight of
legal authority indicates that a federal district court could not properly exercise habeas
jurisdiction over an alien detained at [Guantanamo Bay]" (alteration in original) (quoting
Memorandum from Patrick E Philbin & John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep't of Def. (Dec. 28,
2001))).
203. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 E3d 1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("[Tlhe due

process clause does not apply to aliens without property or presence in the sovereign territory
of the United States." (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783-84 (1950))).
204. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Neff v. George, 4 N.E.2d
388, 390-91 (I1. 1936)).
205. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827-28 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

206. Id.
207. BENJMImN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20 (1949).
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discussed here. The lower courts felt obliged to follow their
precedents, and the Supreme Court, even in narrowing or avoiding the
specific rules of those cases, never overruled any of them.
Various arguments have been made for adhering to the policy of
stare decisis. As the Supreme Court has explained, "Stare decisisis the
preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and
consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial
decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the
judicial process.""8 It also promotes an interest in finality in the law."9
Stare decisis has been justified as supportive of the "[s]tability and
continuity of political institutions" ' and rule of law values'P and as a
basis for "coordinated decisionmaking. ' It has also been justified as
providing a well of reasoned decision making, utilizing the experience
and judgment of many generations of decision makers"3 or as part of a
common law process of working the law pure." 4
The poor fit between the four World War II cases discussed above
and the doctrinal justifications for stare decisis should be apparent. At
the very least, these are far from paradigmatic cases for such
treatment. Far from part of a long line of tradition, these cases are best
described as historical orphans. With the possible exception of
Eisentrager,these cases were largely novel and were not themselves
208. Payne,501 U.S. at 827.
209. Id ("Adhering to precedent 'is usually the wise policy, because in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than it be settled right."' (quoting
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393,406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
210. Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 723, 748 (1988).
211. See Burt Neuborne, The Binding Quality of Supreme Court Preceden 61 TUL.
L. REv. 991, 994-96 (1987).
212. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, Ill HARV. L.
REv. 56, 109 (1997).
213. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law. The Course and Patternof
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOwA L. REv. 601, 652 (2001) ("[R]espect for
precedent fosters respect for the judiciary. It requires consistency and improves decision
making by requiring judges to draw on a body of law that represents the collective experience
and knowledge ofjudges over time.").
214. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: ConstitutionalStare
Decisis,Legal Formalism,and the Future of UnenumeratedRights,9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155,
191 (2006) ("Isolated holdings become general rules which acquire exceptions. One way of
establishing this point is via the familiar maxim: 'The law works itself pure."' (quoting
Omychund v. Barker, (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23)); Frederick Schauer, Do CasesMake Bad
Law 73 U. Cm. L. REv. 883, 906 (2006) ("More concretely, one of the arguments for casebased lawmaking has always been the allegedly self-correcting character of the common law,
a phenomenon that often rides under the banner, in the words of Lord Mansfield made
famous by Lon Fuller, of the common law 'work[ing] itself pure."' (quoting Omychund 26
Eng. Rep. at 23; LON L. FULLER, THE LAW tN QUEST OF ITSELF 140 (1940))).
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the result of any "consistent development."2 '5 Quti)7,21 6 in fact, seems
at odds with Ex parte MtIligan,' 7 the most pertinent prior precedent.
Nor, again with possible exception of Eisentrager,were the rules in
these decisions developed in subsequent case law.2 8 Prior to 2001,
these cases had largely been forgotten and citations to them were
insignificant and few.2"9 The singularity of these precedents lowers the
stakes of choosing not to follow them; neither the stability of the court
nor respect for its decisions seem legitimately threatened by the
dismissal of four long-forgotten cases. Nor can it be said that the rules
reflected in the four decisions have been worked pure by later courts or
proven wise by later applications.
Stability, predictability, and other rule-of-law principles all seem
odd fits for justifying adherence to these four decisions. Certainly, the
Bush Administration hoped that these decisions would prove accurate
predictions of how the current Court might hold, and some have
argued that these decisions reflect stable rules applicable in wartime.2"
But at the same time, all four decisions recognize wartime exceptions
to the due process rights individuals have in peacetime. They present
rules vastly different from those individuals normally expect and
courts normally apply. It seems strange to argue that rules that have
not been applied for fifty years should be used now out of concern for
stability and predictability.
So should the four decisions be given a presumption of stare
decisis? In PlannedParenthood v Casey, the Court suggested four
specific factors that should be considered before deciding to depart
from stare decisis and overrule a prior case. 21' These include
(1) "whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability"; (2) "whether the rule is subject to a kind of
215. Eisentageris at least in line with territorial views of the Constitution's scope
visible in In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), holding that the Constitution does not give
temporary subject the right to trial by jury from crimes committed outside United States, and
the Insular Cases. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904) (holding that
right of trial by jury did not extend to Philippines); Territory of Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197, 218 (1903) (holding that constitutional protection did not apply in territorial Hawaii);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (holding that Constitution did not fully apply in
Puerto Rico); see also supra notes 173-182 and accompanying text.
216. ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
217. 71 U.S. 2, 77 (1866); see Vdzquez, supra note 35, at 240-41 (discussing tensions
between Milligan and Qwni'n).
218. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); see supra notes 172-178 and
accompanying text.
219. See supra Part I.A.
220. Cf POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 4-5.
221. 505 U.S. 833, 845-55 (1992).
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reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation"; (3) "whether
related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old
rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine"; or (4) "whether
facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have
' The
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification."222
Court has also explained that it does not "apply stare decisis as rigidly
in constitutional [cases] as in nonconstitutional cases. 223 On the
contrary, "Considerations in favor of stare decisis are at their acme in
cases involving property and contract rights, where reliance interests
are involved ...."2

These four factors, however, are meant to capture the costs and
benefits of overruling the prior decision or departing from it. They do
not really answer the question of whether stare decisis should attach to
a decision in the first place. This is an important distinction.
Suggesting that stare decisis should not apply is not the same as
suggesting the prior decision should be overruled or ignored. Instead,
the question is whether the prior opinion should be given any special
weight in deciding a current case. The normal presumption of stare
decisis might be thought of as a deferential standard of review-the
prior holding will be upheld unless there are particularly strong
reasons not to. The real question posed by the four undead wartime
cases discussed here is when the rule in a prior precedent should be
looked at de novo"' In the absence of a presumption of stare decisis, a
prior decision might be viewed as persuasive authority. If a court finds
222. Id.
223. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (alteration
in original) (quoting Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962)).
224. Id.at 828.
225. In essence, in the absence of stare decisis, one might treat the prior case much as
state courts treat the decisions of other state's courts or in the manner many have suggested
foreign decisions should be treated: as an important data point about how another court
treated a similar issue, one whose reasoning might be persuasive or might not. See, e.g.,
Osmar J. Benvenuto, Note, Reevaluating the Debate Surroundingthe Supreme Courtz Use of
ForeignPreceden4 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 2695, 2726-30 (2006) (laying out arguments in favor
of foreign decisions as persuasive evidence). The decisions of foreign courts need to be
examined carefully-the courts, constitutional provisions, and local circumstances may all
differ in ways that make their opinions less pertinent to a U.S. case. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer,
Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the American Society of
International Law Proceedings (Apr. 2-5, 2003), 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 265, 268
(2003) (making clear that foreign precedent must be "briefed fully, with a comprehensive
explanation of the legal relationship[]"). These wartime decisions, separated from us by
history rather than geography, may need to be examined in the same way. See M.N.S.
SELLERS, REPUBLICAN LEGAL THEORY: THE HISTORY, CONSTITUTION AND PURPOSES OF LAW IN

A FREE STATE 99 (2003) ("Legal history is comparative law without travel.").
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the prior reasoning persuasive or illustrative it may choose to reaffirm
the prior rule. Alternatively, it may reject the prior court's reasoning
and with it, that court's result.
The four Casey factors do not really go to this question."6 Even
so, they make a very weak case for applying stare decisis to the four
cases discussed here. The first factor, whether the rule has proven
practically "intolerable" or "unworkable" is simply inapposite to these
cases. The rules have not been applied since then, so there is little
evidence one way or the other. Whether the underlying facts have
changed is similarly difficult to answer. Both everything and nothing
has changed since World War II. Aside from the obvious fact that the
enemy is different, the nature of the war is different (rather than a
pitched battle between two leagues of states, the United States is now
embroiled in a global conflict with a terrorist organization), the
applicable international law is different (new Geneva Conventions
were ratified in 1949 and modem human rights only developed after
World War I), 2"7 and modem society is obviously different (people and
information travel with ease unimaginable in the 1940s). On the other
hand, little has changed. Warfare still raises the same questions of
institutional competence and separation of powers and the same
concerns about expediency, secrecy, intelligence gathering, and civil
rights.
The second factor, reliance, seems similarly inapposite. The
Bush Administration did argue that it relied on the four precedents in
planning its post-September 11 strategies."' Guantanamo Bay was
specifically chosen as a detention site based on Eisentager'sseeming
promise that extraterritorial detentions would be beyond judicial
review, a point Justice Scalia highlighted in his Rasu dissent.229
Although this would seem like the type of reliance that "would lend a
special hardship to the consequences of overruling," the Court has
suggested that this second Casey factor is meant less to protect the
226. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 845-55.
227. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF
RIGHTS 1 (1990) ("The contemporary idea of human rights was formulated during the
Second World War and its aftermath.").
228. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
229. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950); see Rasu, 542 U.S. at 506
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for frustrating "our military commanders'
reliance upon clearly stated prior law").
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Government than to protect individuals. 3° Certainly, it would seem
severe to curtail individual rights merely to avoid inconveniencing the
Government.23 l
Opponents of the Bush Administration's policies have made
arguments concerning the third Casey factor, arguing that the
availability of habeas corpus has expanded considerably since the
1940s, that decisions like Eisentagerare based on outdated notions of
territoriality, and that the highly technical approach of the four World
War II decisions looks increasingly quaint, outdated, or strange.232 And
Justice Stevens used such an argument in his Rasul opinion, arguing
that Eisentqagels statutory holding had been based on precedents
about habeas procedure that have since been rejected. 3 But, in
general, arguments about developments in related areas of law depend
on one's definition of related areas of law. One could argue that the
relevant categories include equal protection and habeas law. But one
could also argue that the only truly relevant area is emergency or
wartime law, neither of which have necessarily changed. In a sense,
the answer seems largely indeterminate, boiling down to one's
preconception of the principles relevant to these wartime cases.
Altogether, what one is left with is a highly uncertain doctrinal
case for stare decisis. Few of the justifications for stare decisis suggest
granting a presumption in favor of the four World War II cases
considered here, and the factors normally considered for and against
overruling a prior rule seem decidedly inapposite or uncertain.
Whether or not stare decisis should be applied to these cases seems
instead to involve some broader judgment of the wisdom of these
decisions. Have the holdings of these wartime cases come to be seen
as morally or constitutionally "intolerable?" Have our background
understandings of the constitutional values at stake in these cases
changed enough to sap them of their vigor? Answering these
questions requires a more serious historical inquiry, the topic that will
be tackled in the next Part.
230. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (recasting second Casey factor
as "individual or societal reliance" and rejecting claims of reliance by state government).
231. Of course, the Bush Administration certainly would have argued that more was at
stake than simply inconveniencing the Government.
232. Robert Knowles & Marc D. Falkoff, Toward a Limited-Government Theory of
ExtaterritorialDetention, 62 N.YU. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 637, 652 (2007); cf Diane Marie
Amann, Guantdnano,42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 263, 290-92 (2004) (making same point
about expanded scope of due process doctrine).
233. Rasu, 542 U.S. at 479 (majority opinion); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.
Ct. 2229, 2257 (2008) (discussing history of expansion of habeas corpus).
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Teachersand Students

[Vol. 84:957

While stare decisis's message may be hard to hear in these cases,
shouted proclamations about the "lessons of history" have been hard to
tune out. Articles, books, and speeches drawing lessons from the
history of wartime cases, often explicitly admonishing that the
"lessons of history" be heeded, have been ubiquitous.23" Sometimes
these lessons are cast in broad terms, as the lessons of wartime cases
more generally. Other times, the calls are more specific, asking us to
heed the lessons of a particular case, like Qu/id" or Yamashitaf.6 But
the lessons to be learned fit a relatively standard model: In response to
234. See, e.g., The Hon. Frank J. Williams et al., Still a Fightening Unknown:
Achieving a ConstitutionalBalanceBetween Ciwi LibertiesandNationalSecunty During the
War on Terror, 12 RoGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 675, 746 (2007) ("What is shocking is the
failure by many to put the current crisis, including war making in historical perspective. As
always, there is much to be learned from history."); Geoffrey R. Stone, A Lawyer
Responsibility. ProtectingCivil Libertiesin Wartime, 22 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 47 passin
(2006) ("One of the lessons of American history is that when episodes of military conflict
arise we not only compromise our liberties, but we do so excessively and to a degree we often
come later to regret. The challenge is to understand why that happens, to avoid repeating the
same pattern of mistakes in the present and in the future, and to articulate the role of lawyers
in addressing those questions.").
235. See, e.g., Ronald W Meister, In Time of War: Hitlerk Terronist Attack on
America, N.YL.J. Oct. 11, 2005, available at http://www.cll.com/files/RWMNYLJArticle.
PDF (book review) (discussing "the weakness of Quirn as a precedent," questioning whether
the courts had learned "the beneficial lessons of history," and pondering "whether the current
Supreme Court will consider Quihn to be a valuable precedent, or instead regard it as the
Court and the country at large have come to view its notorious decision two years later in
Korematsd'); Judith Resnik, Invading the Courts: We Don't Need Military "Tribunals" to
Sort Out the Guilty, 25 LEGAL TIMES 14 (2002) ("Many of us who teach that case [Quin]
had grouped it with other 'war cases'-the 1940s decisions in Korematsu and IIiabayashi
.... [W]e know now that the restrictions on civil rights tolerated by the Supreme Court [in
Quin] were unnecessary and wrong."); Michal R. Belknap, A PutridPedigree: The Bush
Admim'station's Military Thbunals in HistoricalPerspective, 38 CAL. W, L. REv. 433, 480
(2002) ("As we have seen, the history of American military commissions is not a happy
one.... Their tainted history suggests that they can only tarnish a just war on terrorism.").
236. See, e.g., Harlington Wood, Jr., "RealJudges, "58 NYU ANN. SURV. OF AM. L.
259, 274 (2001) ("But now, because of the terrorists' uncivilized attacks, the use of a military
tribunal is again being considered as advocated by Attorney General Ashcroft. When I saw
that in the paper several weeks ago I took the liberty of sending copies of the dissents of
Justice Rutledge and Justice Murphy from the Yamashita case to the Attorney General so that
neither he nor his staff would overlook the history lessons to be learned." (footnote omitted));
Major Bruce D. Landrum, The Yamashita War Crimes Trial:. CommandResponsibilityThen
and Now, 149 M1L. L. RE. 293, 300-01 (1995) ("[I]f prosecutors must prove command
responsibility ... they will have to prove that the accused 'knew or had reason to know' of the
violations and then wrongfully failed to act.... [A]ny conviction obtained without such proof
would only martyr the accused and likely would not 'meet the judgment of history.' Such are
the lessons of Yamashita." (footnote omitted)).
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wartime threats, the Executive branch reacts aggressively, often at the
expense of civil liberties and vulnerable minorities.237 While some of
these reactions are rational good-faith responses to apparent threats,
others are panic-driven overreactions,23 politically driven attempts to
look decisive,"' or opportunistic exploitations of public fear."' Judges,
paralyzed by a want of information and afraid to put Americans at risk,
scrap their customary scrutiny of Executive acts and defer. "' Only
with the return of peace, do Americans realize the overreactions and
regret the attacks on civil liberties. " The "lesson" of this history is
that the cycle
must be broken and civil liberties vigilantly guarded in
243
wartime.
237. Cole, supra note 16, at 1349 ("The history of emergencies in the United States
reflects a consistent pattern in which government officials target liberty-infringing security
measures at the most vulnerable, usually foreign nationals, while reassuring the majority that
their own rights are not being undermined.").
238. See Stone, supra note 234, at 52 ("So, throughout our history we have a pattern of
overreacting to the demands of wartime and unnecessarily restricting civil liberties.");
Geoffrey R. Stone, WarFever,69 Mo. L. REv. 1131, 1148 (2004) ("On the other hand, history
is replete with instances in which the nation has excessively suppressed civil liberties in
wartime without any compelling or even reasonable justification."); David Cole, Judging the
Next Emergency: JudicialReview and Individual Rights in Times of Cisis, 101 MIcH. L.
REv. 2565, 2590 (2003) ("[T]he public and their elected representatives are especially prone
to overreaction during times of crisis?).
239. See Cole, supra note 16, at 1350 ("Accordingly, politicians will pursue 'the
course of least resistance'--selectively sacrificing the liberties of vulnerable groups in the
name of furthering the security of the majority. It is much easier to sell an initiative that
denies the rights only of foreign nationals than one that requires everyone to sacrifice their
rights."); Stone, supra note 238, at 1140-41 ("In such circumstances, the best way to alleviate
public fear may be to demonstrate that the government is taking action, whether or not such
action is likely to be effective. Although this may calm the public, the very fact that the
government takes drastic action may also affirm the legitimacy of the fear.").
240. See David Strauss, Presentation at Free Speech in Wartime Conference (Jan. 16,
2005), 36 RTGERS L.J. 919, 921 (2005) (identifying threat of opportunism in wartime
reactions and using Japanese internment as particularly good example of phenomenon);
Stone, supra note 238, at 1149 ("Laws restricting civil liberties are especially appealing to
public officials in wartime because they are relatively inexpensive, cater to public fear, create
the illusion of decisive action, burden only those who already are viewed with contempt, and
enable public officials to silence their critics in the guise of serving the national interest.").
241. See WILLtAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 221 (1998) ("[J]udges, like other citizens, do not wish to hinder a nation's 'war
effort' ....
");Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties v National Secuity in the Lawk Open
Areas; 86 B.U. L. REv. 1315, 1329 (2006) ("Throughout our history, judges have erred too
much on the side of deference in times of crisis. Like other citizens, judges do not want the
nation to lose a war, and they certainly do not want to be responsible for a mass tragedy.").
242. See Stone, supra note 234, at 48 ("One of the lessons of American history is that
when episodes of military conflict arise we not only compromise our liberties, but we do so
excessively and to a degree we often come later to regret.").
243. See id at 52 ("[I]t is not clear that when the situation arises again, and the same
fears overtake the nation, we will be any better at addressing the problem."); id.at 53 ("A
critical challenge, then, is to figure out how to learn from our own history and how to use that
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Although this story is oft-repeated, it can be difficult to discern
exactly how it should be used by judges. Are prior precedents useless?
If so, which ones? The specifics seem mumbled. Part of the problem
is that those proclaiming the lessons of history are often unclear to
whom they are speaking, who they hope will heed these lessons.
Sometimes, they seem to be speaking primarily to the political
branches, warning them not to repeat the policies earlier courts
upheld.2" Other times, they seem to be speaking to the American
public, warning them not to tolerate the policies chosen by their
wartime leader and endorsed by their wartime courts.245 At times, it is
unclear whether the true target of their wrath is the decisions of the
Court or the government policies they upheld.2"6 Perhaps most
confusingly, these commentators express extreme skepticism about
what courts can do, practically accepting poor wartime performance as
inevitable. 247 Nonetheless, despite this cynicism and confusion,
explicitly or implicitly, these would-be teachers seem to be talking to
courts as well, warning them not to follow their past mistakes and

learning in a way that prevents, or at least makes less likely, the repetition of the same errors
over and over again.").
244. See, e.g., Joseph Margulies, The Right to a Fair Triali the War on Teror, 10
GoNz. J. INT'L L. 57, 58-59 (2006) ("I am astounded at how a-historical, how mindless, and
how utterly ignorant the administration seems to be of the lessons of history...."); Stone,
supia note 234, at 53-54 (discussing the role government lawyers should play in policing
abuses during wartime); Stone, supr note 238, at 1142 ("Congress could also respond better
in the future by taking the Constitution more seriously. Just as a deeper understanding of civil
liberties might enable the public to react more calmly to the exigencies of wartime, so too a
deeper appreciation of constitutional rights might help their elected senators and
representatives better meet their responsibilities."); id. at 1144 ("A similar evaluation applies
to the executive."); Belknap, supra note 235, at 480 (learning from Quhin the lesson that
military commissions are a bad idea, rather than that the Court was wrong to uphold them).
245. See, e.g., Margulies, supa note 244, at 59 (speaking to lessons "we" should learn
from history); Geoffrey R. Stone, Foreword A (dture of Civil Liberties, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
825 passim (2005) (regularly invoking "we" as students of history's lessons); David Cole, The
PriorityofMorality: The Emergency Constitution. Blind Spo4 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1755
(2004) ("History suggests that we ought to do everything we can to restrict suspicionless
preventive detention, not to expandit."(first two emphases added)).
246. Another problem is that Korematsu thoroughly dominates these discussions,
obscuring everything else.
247. See, e.g., Stone, supa 234, at 54 ("Through history the Court has a mixed record
in meeting its responsibilities."); Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE
L.J. 1029, 1043 (2004) ("If Hugo Black fell down on the job, will his successors do any
better?"); Cole, supa note 245, at 1761 (explaining that Bruce Ackerman would replace
judicial review with a supermajoritarian escalator "because courts are largely ineffectual on
matters of national security," and observing that "[tihere is substantial and familiar evidence
to support that charge").
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asking them to look at future wartimes cases with the lessons of
previous wars in mind.4 8
There is one group of commentators that is clearer in its
directions to judges. A number of commentators have argued that the
traditional criticisms of wartime decisions are infected with hindsight
bias-from their peacetime perch, modern critics diminish the threats
those prior courts had to consider. 29 Instead, these countercommentators assert an alternative lesson of history, that these wartime
decisions represent the best attempts by judges faced with the very real
dangers and uncertainties of wartime to balance concerns for national
security and liberty and as such should be followed.25°
This Part asks what courts can or should do with all these
competing suggested lessons and considers the role history should play
in determining the stare decisis effect of these four decisions. After
first putting the question into some context for the problem of using
history, this Part lays out three possible models of what we might mean
when we suggest that judges learn the lessons of history: (1) history as
facts about the original case that undermine our confidence in the
substantive decision or the process by which it was decided; (2) history
as extrajudicial "replacement-precedent" with the post-decision
judgment of the elected branches, the public, or possibly others taking
center-stage; and (3) history as a vehicle of constitutional principal, as
a means for understanding constitutional commitments. Intriguingly,
Geoffrey R. Stone, NationalSecuriy v Civil Liberties,95 CAL. L. REV.
248. See, e.g.,
2203, 2209 (2007) ("Because we know from experience that there is a pattern of excessive
restriction of civil liberties in wartime, courts in the twenty-first century must abandon the
'logical' presumption of deference to executive and military authority and employ a more
rigorous standard of review."); Stone, supra note 241, at 1329 ("Throughout our history,
judges have erred too much on the side of deference in times of crisis. Like other citizens,
judges do not want the nation to lose a war, and they certainly do not want to be responsible
for a mass tragedy."); Stone, supra note 245, at 829 ("We should not expect too little of our
judges. They have an essential role to play in these circumstances, and we should not be too
quick to invite them to abdicate their responsibilities."); Stone, supra note 238, at 1145
("What is the appropriate role of courts in wartime? To what extent can-and should-the
Constitution, as interpreted and applied by the judiciary, restrain the pressures for wartime
suppression of dissent?"); id at 1152 ("As the Court has learned by experience and sustained
reflection, if the nation is to preserve civil liberties in the face of wartime fear and hysteria,
the Court must articulate clear constitutional rules that are not easily circumvented or
manipulated by prosecutors, jurors, Presidents, or even future Supreme Court Justices.").
249. See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 86 ("With the benefit of
hindsight, the early reactions might seem inexplicable except as the result of panic. But this
does not do justice to the problem that the government faces at the time of emergency, when
uncertainty is great and the consequence of error may be catastrophic."); POSNER, LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, supranote 26, at 299.
250. See, e.g., POSNER&VERMEULE, supr note 18, at 4-5.
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these three models differ not only in how history is used, but also in the
period of history to be investigated. Each focuses on a different period
of time: The first looks at the history of the case itself. The second
looks at the history of the period following the Court's decision. The
third, finally, looks at the present, at contemporary reactions to the case
and its holding. These Parts consider when, if ever, any of these
models should play a role in the stare decisis analysis of earlier cases.
B.

History Mysteries

Law and history have a long and tangled relationship."' History
and historical arguments make regular appearances in judicial opinions
and briefs. Eisentrager spent considerable space discussing the
historical treatment of enemy aliens by the United States, " ' and its
successor, Boumediene, delved deeply into the scope of the writ of
habeas corpus in pre-1789 Great Britain. " Moreover, the process of
parsing precedent looks in many ways like historical analysis; courts
do not only look to prior opinions for wisdom, but carefully interrogate
the facts of
those cases to determine whether current ones are truly
254
analogous.

Originalism has provided the deepest discussion of the
relationship between history and stare decisis. Recent debates over
when and whether stare decisis should be applied have focused on
potential conflicts between precedent and original public meaning.
With the Casey-Rod" line of abortion-rights cases as their main
inspiration, scholars have debated whether judges should always,
sometimes, or never overrule decisions that conflict with their
assessment of the Constitution's original meaning. "6 At first glance,
251.

See, e.g., Matthew J. Festa, Applying a Usable Past. The Use ofistoryin Law,

38 SETON HALL L. REv. 479,481 (2008).
252.
253.

Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,772-76 (1950).
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229,2245-46(2008).

254. See, e.g., Festa, supra note 251, at 484 ("At bottom, the legal system and the
writing of history are both concerned with establishing the facts of past events and with
providing interpretations that establish a workable understanding of the truth."); Harlan Grant
Cohen, The (Un)favorable Judgment of Ihstory" DeportationHearings, the PalmerRaids,
and the Meaning ofHistory,78 N.YU. L. REv. 1431, 1469 (2003) ("History is not merely an
antiquarian collection of facts... but rather a process of interpretation and reinterpretation.").
255.
(1973).
256.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and OiginalMeaning,24 CONST. COMMENT.

291 (2007) (arguing for right to abortion based on original meaning); Steven G. Calabresi,
Text, Precedent, and the Constitution: Some Onginaist and Nonnative Arguments for
Overruling Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 22 CONST. COMMENT.

HeinOnline -- 84 Tul. L. Rev. 1000 2009-2010

2010]

"UNDEAD" WARTIME CASES

1001

that question might seem analogous to the question posed here:
namely, the extent to which history's approbation for a particular
opinion should affect its value as precedent. Both questions involve
historical investigations and focus on the meaning of constitutional
history; arguments against a precedent from originalism might be
framed as arguments that history shows a case was wrongly decided.
Both questions ask when a current judge should second-guess the
analysis of a prior one.
But upon closer analysis, it becomes clear that such discussions
reveal little about the application of the lessons of history suggested
here.257 Originalist discussions of stare decisis are concerned with the
prehistory of a particular opinion. The assumption is that historical
materials dictated a particular holding that the actual holding can be
measured against. There is a binary quality to the historical analysis:
the opinion is either right or wrong in its assessment of the original
meaning of a particular provision. In a sense, the question lines up
well with the either-or nature of the Caseystaredecisis factors; in both
311 (2005) (arguing that Supreme Court should follow original meaning over its own
precedent and overturn Casey).
257. None of this is meant to discount the possibility that originalist arguments might
be relevant to the cases discussed here. Nor should this imply that the lessons of history
would trump original meaning. The point instead is that the question of original history is a
different one from the one posed here, and originalist analysis of the cases here is accordingly
set-aside for another time. To the extent that originalist history dictates a particular answer in
one of these cases, whether the one adopted by the Court or not, see Boumediene, 128 S. Ct.
at 2303-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting); its effect must be considered, but that would be the topic of
another paper.
Interestingly though, the wartime cases discussed here have rarely turned on questions
of original meaning. Rather than focusing on the content of specific powers or rights granted
by the Constitution, these cases have focused on balancing different rights and powers against
one another or on mediating interbranch conflicts. Many of these cases are best framed as
cases about deference, about when the judiciary should second-guess decisions made by the
Executive or Congress and when it should defer. The one possible exception would be the
question whether habeas corpus is available to aliens held outside the United States raised
first in Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763, and later in Rasul v Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), and
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229. In Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2246, Justice Kennedy does
look at the purpose and scope of habeas corpus in 1789, a question of original meaning. But
even there, the original meaning plays a limited role: Justice Kennedy finds the historical
evidence regarding the scope of the writ ambiguous, relying on the history instead to support
his views on the Judiciary's role in reviewing the Executive. Once jurisdiction over the
habeas petitions is established, Justice Kennedy returns to a fact-specific balancing test. The
relief available to habeas petitioner turns on "how much process is due" under the
circumstances. Eisentrager,the case it distinguishes and whose stare decisis effect is in
question here, seemed to turn at least as much on practical concerns regarding the effect of
judicial review in such a case as it does on the historical scope of the writ. For an interesting
discussion of originalist theory's imperfect fit with and apparent disinterest in foreign affairs
law, see generally Ingrid Wuerth, An Onginalismfor ForeignAffairs, 53 ST. Louis U. L.J. 5
(2008).
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cases, the question is whether the particular holding should be
followed or overruled. Most of all, originalist theories imbue the
history they are concerned with, the history of a provision's
ratification, with legal (or specifically, constitutional) meaning.
Originalist history becomes the proper method of legal interpretation;
its authority flows from the Constitution itself.
The lessons of history invoked here, on the other hand, look at the
history following a particular court decision. They ask whether
subsequent information or events have undermined the wisdom of a
prior decision. While it is possible that subsequent history may
indicate that the case was wrongly decided, it may not go that far; it
may simply raise questions about the earlier court's process or logic
that undermine the authority of the holding. A future court applying
logic or processes taught by the lessons of history might reach the
same result as the earlier court. Moreover, the authority to look at such
history is far less clear. Why should it matter what subsequent
observers thought of a particular opinion?258
This does not mean that looking to post-decision history is
without precedent.
As seen above, subsequent historical
considerations are actually baked into the stare decisis analysis, though
in a narrow way.259 The Casey factors ask how the rule has operated
since being handed down, whether the rule has engendered reliance,
how other related rules have developed over the interim, and whether
key facts underlying the rule have changed or come to be seen
differently.26° All of these questions look at the history of the rule since
the earlier case had been decided. More broadly, lawyers often attack a
rule by arguing that a case cited is "old,"26 seemingly recognizing that
time might strip a precedent of its potency, and the law does recognize
258. There are, of course, constitutional theories that seek to explain how subsequent
historical events can undermine a precedent. See, e.g.,
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998). But such "living constitution" theories generally explain how
constitutional meaning can be changed by the passage of time. The lessons of history
invoked here do not have such high aspirations. They do not argue that constitutional
meaning has changed, but rather that the original court got something wrong.
259.

See supraPart II.B.

260.

Casey,505 U.S. at 854-55.

261. See, e.g., Keeler v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 672 A.2d 1012, 1017 (Del. 1996) ("But
precedents, over time, may lose their acceptability...."); Brief of Appellant at 13, Massey v.
Delaware, No. 82, 2009 (Del. June 11, 2009) ("As stated previously, and contrary to the
outdated and distant cases cited by the Appellee ....
");Brief of Respondent at 10, Grant v.
Laughlin Envtl., Inc., No. 09-0391 (Tex. May 29, 2009) ("Petitioner focuses on two cases that
are allegedly 'precedent' requiring the First Court of Appeals to apply the "unclean hands"
exception to awarding quantum meruit awards: a thirty-year-old case from Houston, Norris
ofHouston v Gafas, and a fifty-eight-year-old case out of Amarillo, Rodgers v Tracy.").
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the concept of desuetude-that is, that a rule can lose it force as law if
long ignored and unenforced. The fifty-year lapse between the World
War II cases discussed here and their reconsideration after September
11 might be thought of in a similar way. Yet standards for desuetude
are notoriously difficult to define and opinions citing the principle are
rare.262
The hesitance surrounding concepts like desuetude is easy to
understand.263 One of the main functions of the legal system is to
promote stability and predictability. Stability and predictability are
also key components of the law's and courts' perceived legitimacy.
Other countervailing legal interests, like justice, may at times outweigh
those principles, but courts are predictably wary of endorsing a legal
theory as potentially destabilizing as desuetude. The potential
destabilizing effects of using history to trump precedent must similarly
be taken into account. Too broad or indeterminate a role for history in
stare decisis doctrine could unravel the predictability of precedent
altogether. In an effort to provide clarity to cases like those discussed
here, such a doctrine might instead spread chaos and uncertainty
through the entire legal system.
Further complicating the search for a method of using history
here is the fact that lawyers and judges have often used history badly.
Lawyers have been accused by historians of practicing law-office
history," or history-lite,265 or forensic history 66-- all poor imitations of

262. See generally Desuetude, 119 HARV. L.REv. 2209 (2006) (arguing in favor of
desuetude). The doctrine "currently enjoys recognition in the courts of West Virginia and
nowhere else." Id Desuetude has been discussed in a number of cases, although generally
rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 347 F Supp. 2d 626, 629 (E.D. Wis. 2004)
(discussing but ultimately rejecting desuetude as defense against Migratory Bird Treaty Act
because there had been recent prosecutions); United States v. Elliott, 266 F Supp. 318, 326
(S.D.N.Y 1967) ("we find little
analytical aid in merely applying, or refusing to apply, the
rubric of desuetude. The problem must be approached in terms of that fundamental fairness
owed to the particular defendant that is the heart of due process.").
263. Other similar concepts might include "fundamental changes in circumstances" in
contract and treaty law. The international law version of this argument, rebussic stantibus,is
notoriously rarely applied. See Harlan Grant Cohen,FindingInternationalLaw: Rethinking
the Doctrine ofSources,93 IOWA L.REv 65, 90-92 (2007).
264. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, For Whom Is the Heller Decision Important and
Why, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L.REv. 315, 327 (2009) (criticizing opinions in Helleras examples
of "law office history").
265. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History 'Lite" in Modem American
Constitutionalism,95 COLUM.L.REv. 523 (1995).
266. See generallyJohn Phillip Reid, Law and History,27 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 193, 204
(1993).
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the real thing.267 Lawyers are accused of cherry-picking historical facts
that fit the arguments they would like to make, rather than trying to
understand historical events and the contexts in which they arose.268
While lawyers often look to history for "answers" historians are quick
to point out that history involves subtle interpretations of the past and
rarely dictates the outcome of cases.269 History is much better at
complicating our understandings of the past than at confirming them.
These criticisms need to be kept in mind as we determine how to
use the "lessons of history" with regard to these wartime cases. While
there are many views of how history should be used, certain basic
historical principles like change over time, context, causality,
contingency, and complexity, may prove useful guideposts in figuring
out what the lesson of history should actually teach.'
C

Three Models

1.

Model 1: History Complicates

Perhaps the simplest and most obvious use of history is as a
source of information about the original case or decision. Where an
investigation of the facts surrounding the case reveals anomalies,
errors, or even malfeasance in either the facts on which the decision
relied or the process by which the decision was made, we might say
that "history" counsels skepticism and undermines the decision's
precedential value. This use of history comes closest to one of the
usual stare decisis factors, "whether facts have so changed, or come to
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification." '' Using history in this way also seems
both logical and reasonable. Decisions gain legitimacy and value as
precedent from their honest consideration of facts through proper legal
267. Of course, the ire of historians does not, by itself, make lawyers' use of history
"wrong." It could very well be that "bad history" is good law and that what is a misuse of
history for historians is a perfectly prudent use for lawyers. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea
ofa UseablePas 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 602 (1995) ("[T]he historian and the constitutional
lawyer have legitimately different roles."); Reid, supra note 266, at 222 (suggesting that
"forensic history" might serve certain useful legal functions even it fails as matter of history).
268. See Reid, supra note 266, at 195-97 ("In discovering the past, the historian
weighs every bit of evidence that comes to hand. The lawyer, by contrast, is after the single
authority that will settle the case at bar.").
269. See Suzanna Sherry, The Indeterminacy ofHistoricalEvidence, 19 HARv. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 437, 441 (1996) (suggesting that historians generally do not try to answer the
questions that lawyers do).
270. Thomas Andrews & Flannery Burke, What Does ItMean To Think -hstorcallyZ
45 Am.HIST. ASS'N PERSP. 1 (2007).

271. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
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process. Where either seems missing, particularly as a result of
apparent deceit, a decision warrants greater scrutiny. This model for
using history's lesson also fits well with arguments that history is best
used to add complexity and context and to complicate our
understanding of past events." '
Exparte Quinn presents a perfect case for applying history in this
273
way. As explained above, the story of Quin is one that immediately
raises skepticism about the decision. The military commission was
convened under a veil of secrecy, 74 and the true facts of how the plot
was foiled were kept from the public and possibly even the Court.21
The Government was as concerned with looking capable and
determined as it was with bringing the plotters to justice.

211

The

military commission's procedures were of questionable fairness, with
highly permissive evidence rules and a panel of nonlawyer judges.
The procedures were also difficult to square with the Articles of War. "'
Justice Frankfurter played an unusual role in the decision, first
advising the Government on how to design the military commissions
in question and then appealing to his colleagues' patriotism to pressure
2 8
them into finding in the Government's favorY.
The entire case took
place under extreme time-pressure: the lawyers had little time to
prepare for the military commissions and less to prepare for the
Supreme Court hearing, the Court began hearing the case even before
it had read the 180 pages of briefs and the 3000 page transcript of the
military commission hearing, and it decided the case only three days
after arguments began. " The Court also decided the case under
pressure from the President, whose threat to ignore the Court if it

272. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 265, at 553-54 (explaining that historical inquiry
"requires viewing, or at least attempting to view, events, ideas, and controversies in a larger
context"); William E. Nelson, 1-hstory and Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdudication, 72 VA.
L. REv. 1237, 1248-49 (1986) ("Buried within the concept of credibility is a further criterion
for evaluating historical interpretations-complexity.... Because historians are aware that
reality is in fact complex, they will normally find the more complex of two historical
interpretations to be the more credible ... "); see also Cohen, supra note 254, at 1469
("History is a process of learning, not a database to be mined. Understanding the lessons of
the past requires care, humility, and engagement." (footnote omitted)).
273. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
274. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting the dark curtains used to keep
out prying eyes).
275. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
276. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
277. Vdzquez, supra note 35, at 225-26.
278. Id.
at 230, 233-34.
279. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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decided against him made it to the justices."' Finally, in the three
months between the short per curiam that decided the case and the
fuller opinion explaining the decision, six of the plotters were executed
and consensus over the Court's reasoning disintegrated.28 ' Multiple
justices on both the Quhil court and contemporary ones have
questioned the precedential value of the case.2 ' If ever the history of a
case suggested giving it less authority, Quin would fit the bill.
But using history in this way is actually more complicated than
the near-universal derision of Quin might make it look. First, there
are various different questions that can be raised about the facts of the
earlier case, and it is not clear that all of them counsel treating the prior
decision in exactly the same way. The question could be about (1) the
process through which the Court's decision was made, (2) the facts
considered by the Court, or (3) facts of the government policy the
Court was weighing. Second, it is unclear how specific the evidence
of anomalies needs to be. Must it be specific to facts of a specific
decision or could it be something known about some decisions used to
raise questions about a broader category of similar cases?
a.

Which Facts?

Suggesting that a precedent should be scrutinized where there are
questions about the process through which the Court heard the case
and rendered its holding seems easy to justify and easy to doctrinalize.
This version of the lessons of history is particularly attractive because
it is decision-neutral: the precedential value of the case is not
determined by which way the Court came down or by whether or not a
future Court agrees with it. Of course, the concomitant of that
decision-neutrality is that under this version of the lessons of history,
the whole decision is rendered questionable. One cannot pick and
choose which aspects of the decision to scrutinize. In the case of
Quinn, this would mean that its authority on presidential power is as
questionable as its authority for the Court's power to consider enemydetainee claims through habeas corpus." 3 All aspects of the decision
are tainted by tainted process.
280.

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

281.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

282.

See supra notes 56-59, 83 and accompanying text (quoting Justices Stone,

Frankfirter, Douglas, and Scalia).

283. It was the latter holding that Justice Stone hoped would be the lasting
contribution of the case. See Vdzquez, supra note 35, at 236. Some have argued that while
the Court's pro-government holdings should be scrutinized, its pro-detainee holdings should

survive. If the problem with Quih7 is its deferential stance, such a distinction between the
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This version of the lessons of history is also extremely narrow
and few decisions will be affected by it. There is no evidence that any
285 or
of the other three cases considered here, Yamashi4ta,2 Hirota,
6
Eisenager,"involve this sort of tainted process. For sure, all of them
were decided under a certain amount of pressure from the government,
and Eisentragerand Hh-ota seem to have been decided to stop a flood
of similar petitions."' Hiro was also subject to behind-the-scenes
politicking by the justices that led to Jackson's nonrecusal and rerecusal, to a concurring opinion that appeared months after the per
curiam, and to a vote that was never actually lodged."' All of these
anomalies, however, look quite ordinary for Supreme Court opinions,
and none seem to raise real concerns about the legitimacy of the
process underlying the Court's holdings.
A second way the history of the case might be relevant is in
raising questions about the facts considered by the Court. This could
involve either the Court's misrepresentation of certain facts it knows or
a party's misrepresentation of facts that the Court then relies on. 89 The
first resembles questions about proper process, and where such
allegations arise, it seems reasonable to question an opinion's authority.
The second is more complicated. Generally speaking, a lie by the
government relied upon by the Court should not automatically
undermine that Court's holding. To the extent that the Court's holding
is keyed to the facts it considered, that holding should remain sound.
Different facts might just require a different holding. To the extent to
which a future case involves facts that resemble those presented by the
holdings makes sense. If, however, the problem is that the Court's process was questionable,
all aspects of the decision must be scrutinized. Perhaps the Court agreed on habeas
jurisdiction solely in order to rubber stamp the FDR Administration's policy.
284.
285.
286.
287.

InreYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
See supra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.

288. See supm notes 140-144 and accompanying text.
289. History might also be used to show that a decision was based on a fact, then
believed to be true, but now known not to be. Changing scientific knowledge might have this
effect. One might characterize the use of sociological evidence to demonstrate that separate
schools did have a detrimental effect on children in Brown v Board ofEducation, 347 U.S.

483, 494-95 (1954), in this way. An analogous argument here might be that Eisentragerwas
based on assumptions about international travel and communication that are no longer true
today. See, e.g., Brian McEvoy, Classified Evidence and the Confrontation Clause:
Correctinga Misapplicationof The ClassifledInformationProceduresAct 23 B.U. INT'L L.J.

395, 493 (2005). A broader argument, that Eisentragergrew out of older notions of
territoriality that are now outdated, might be shoe-horned in here, but probably fits better into
the traditional Caseyfactor that looks at changes in related areas of the law. Eisentager,339
U.S. 763; Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
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government and considered by the Court in the earlier case, the
precedent would seem valid. Here though, in the context of these
wartime cases, many of the holdings revolve specifically around the
level of deference the Court should grant the Executive. In these
cases, lies by the government could undermine the authority of the
Court's opinions. They may suggest that the deference was ill-gotten
and no longer deserved. They may suggest that where the2 °Court had
assumed the government could be trusted, in fact, it cannot. 9
Again though, none of the cases considered here clearly exhibits
these kinds of anomalies. In Quitn, it is possible that the Court was
misled about how the plotters were captured and whether any of them
had tried to turn themselves in, but it is not clear that those facts were
really relevant to the final decision.29 ' The most that might be said of
the others is that in an attempt to garner more deference from the
Court, the government misled the Court in its assessment of the threats
to the United States.292 But this sort of deception, to the extent it
occurred, is much more generalized, and does less to complicate the
facts of a particular case than to raise questions about deference more
generally.
The third type of anomaly that history might stir up is questions
concerning the government policies considered by the Court in each of
the cases. Considering that those invoking the lessons of history are
often unclear whether they are speaking to judges, policy makers, or
the public, it would be unsurprising if it were these sorts of questions
that were actually being raised. 293 Thus the relevant questions
unearthed by history might be the unfairness of the military
commission process given to either the German would-be saboteurs or
General Yamashita, the questionable nature of the charges against
Yamashita, or the questionable nature of the MacArthur-run
M

290. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), fits this model well. We now
know that the evidence of a threat from Japanese-Americans was a fabrication. Norman
Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles"in the Law: Selections from the Oral
HistoryofHerbert Wechsler,93 COLUM. L. REv. 854, 883 & n.84 (1993).
291. ExparteQuirin,317U.S. 1(1942).
292. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763; Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948); Inre
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
293. See supra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
294. See supra Part II.A.2. Arguably, Justice Stevens uses history this way when he
revives Wiley Rutledge's dissent in Yamashita Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 618
(2006) (citing Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 41-81 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)); see discussion supra
notes 110-114 and accompanying text. Notably, he does not use the dissent to prove
Yamashita was wrong but merely to cast a pall over the precedent. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 61920.
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International Military Tribunal for the Far East that heard the case
against Hirota. The history invoked here might also question the
necessity of the processes chosen by the government, particularly
departures from ordinary civil or military trial practice. Here the facts
unearthed by history sweep more broadly, potentially affecting all of
the cases except Eisentrager.
But using history in this way is far more problematic.
Concluding that the underlying decision by policy makers was wrong
(the decision to try the saboteurs by military commission), does not
automatically mean that the Court was wrong in refusing to secondguess that policy maker's decision. Whether a court should defer turns
not only on the likelihood that the policy maker will get it wrong, but
also on institutional concerns about finality, efficiency, legitimacy, and
the Court's relative ability, compared to the policy maker, to get it
right. A Court may be right to defer even where hindsight proves the
policy ill-chosen.
b.

Which Decisions?

Facts about the underlying policies may be more relevant if they
begin to establish a pattern. If history teaches us that the government
often or systematically adopts policies that unnecessarily burden the
rights of detainees, it might raise some questions about some of the
Court's holdings in the area. This raises the second large question
about Model 1, how general or specific the questionable facts must be.
Can the facts history teaches about one case or multiple cases
undermine other decisions that fall into some similar category?
Should flawed process or tainted facts or questionable policies in
Quiri 95 or Yamas/ia 2 ' make Courts suspicious of other wartime
precedents like //rotd or Eisentrage. . .
A broader use of Model 1 seems much closer to the lessons of
history invoked in many articles and books.299 It looks for broad
lessons, for example, that governments often overreact in wartime, that
governments will claim as much authority as the other branches will
let them, that governments often overstate threats, that policies
systematically burden minorities or foreigners, or that Courts are too
deferential to claims of wartime necessity, and applies them to a more
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

317 U.S. 1.
327 U.S. 1.
338 U.S. 197.
339 U.S. 763 (1950).
See supm Part III.A.
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general category of cases. That category might be narrower, for
example, all cases involving military commissions or the rights of
alleged enemy detainees; the category could also be broader, for
example, all cases decided by a particular Court, like the FDR Court,
or even all wartime cases.
There are a number of problems though with this broader version
of Model 1. First, defining the relevant category of cases can be far
more difficult than it might initially appear. For example, while many
are quite cavalier in invoking "wartime" or "emergency" cases,"
others have pointed out that the category is virtually impossible to
define."' Are all cases on any topic decided while the nation is at war
"wartime" cases?0 2 When does the war for these purposes begin and
end? Cases from before the actual outbreak of hostilities. 3 and after
formal surrenders (including three of the cases here, YamashA, 3 '
6), have at times been referred to as wartime
Hirota30 5 and Eisenrage?°
3
cases. 11 Similarly, Posner and Vermeule have argued that the higher
judicial scrutiny in Boumediene than in Hamdi reflects the former's
longer distance from the original emergency-that is, September 11308
Could Hamdibe a wartime case, but Bounedene not? Nor is it clear
which wars count. What about the Vietnam War or the first Gulf War
or the Cold War? To the extent that these lessons are meant to
distinguish some period or some set of cases from another, the
inability to define the relevant categories seems fatal. If wartime cases
300. See supm Part III.A.
301. For a particularly insightful discussion of this problem, see generally Mary L.
Dudziak, Law,War, and the HistoryofTime, 98 CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010).
302. There may be reason to think they are. See genemlly Lee Epstein et al., The
Supreme Court During Crisis: How War Affects Only Non-War Cases, 80 N.YU. L. REv. 1
(2005).
303. For example, Minersville School District v Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), a
decision upholding a flag salute law, has been sometimes described as a peacetime case
decided before American entrance into World War II and sometimes as a wartime case
decided under the shadow of impending war. CompareJack N. Rakove, The Constitutionin
Crisis Times, 2 CARDozo PuB. L. PoL'Y & ETHics J. 11, 14 (2003) (focusing on how outbreak
of war after Gobitisaffected how it was viewed), a'th Richard Danzig, How QuestionsBegot
Answers in Felix Frdnkfurter First Flag Salute Opimon, 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 257, 266-67
(1977) ("Gobitiswas written against the backdrop ...of the need to mobilize America for
war .. 1)
304. InreYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
305. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
306. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
307. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 167 (1948) ("War does not cease with a
cease-fire order, and power to be exercised by the President such as that conferred by the Act
of 1798 is a process which begins when war is declared but is not exhausted when the
shooting stops.").
308.

POSNER&VERMEULE, supmrnote 18, at 51.
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cannot be distinguished from nonwartime cases, it becomes difficult to
argue that stare decisis should treat them in a different way.
But an even bigger problem with the broader uses of Model 1 is
that the higher the level of abstraction of the lesson, the farther it is
removed from the particular questionable case, the more contestable
the lesson becomes. 9 As previously noted, there are actually two
competing versions of the lessons of history."' The one largely
discussed so far teaches that wartime cases were wrongly decided and
that their mistakes should not be repeated. A second group of
commentators, however, takes the opposite view, arguing that the
proper lesson to be learned from wartime cases is that deference to the
Executive during war is wise."' These commentators argue that postwar assessments of wartime decisions are plagued by hindsight
biases."2 In the face of uncertain threats, the government will often
take actions that may in retrospect seem unnecessary. This does not,
however, mean that the action was an unreasonable response to the
information then available, nor that a Court, based on the limited
information available to it, was wrong in deferring to the Executive
branch. These commentators often point to the institutional strengths
and weaknesses of the Executive and Judicial branches, arguing that
the Executive's control of the military, diplomacy, and intelligence, as
well as its ability to act quickly, make it the best-situated branch to deal
with crises. Courts, slow and deliberative, with great expertise in
rights but limited expertise in sifting intelligence, are wise to defer
during emergencies and reassert themselves when calm returns.3 ' The
robust pattern of history, in which the Executive and Judiciary act in
exactly this way, demonstrates its inherent wisdom."'
309. Such abstraction may also be bad history. See, e.g, MARGARET MACMILLAN,
DANGEROUS GAMES: TIE USES AND ABUSES OF HISTORY 37 (2008) ("Bad history ignores

such nuances in favor of tales that belong to morality plays but do not help us to consider the
past in all its complexity."); Richard A. Primus, JudicialPower and Mobilizable History, 65

MD. L. REv. 171, 173 (2006) ("As careful historians are keenly aware, there are serious
intellectual hazards in trying to extract grand patterns, let alone grand arcs of normative
meaning, from any rich and complicated historical record."). Moreover, these broad
abstracted stories can be subjected to the same types of historical critiques described above.
One might point to the apparently clean facts of a particular case, for example Eisentrager,in
an effort to undermine a story that groups it together with the flaws of Quin or Korematsu.
In fact, this might be specifically what good history requires. See Reid, supra note 266, at
204-05 (calling on historians "to learn to harass historical jurisprudence").
310. See supra notes 18-19, 249-250 and accompanying text.
311. POSNER&VERMEULE, supra note 18, at 4-5.
312. See, e.g., id. at 86.
313. Id.at4-5, 18, 30-31, 161-81.
314. Id.at5, 15-18.
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The first story has a clear advantage over this second story when
the wartime decision in question reflects the sort of specific procedural
or factual flaws discussed above. Regardless of the general wisdom of
deference, the particular holding is going to be of questionable
authority. Moreover, the first story probably retains some advantage
with regard to decisions particularly similar or closely related to one
with evident flaws. Thus the authority of a Yamashita, which does not
have any of the known procedural anomalies of Qu!nli, might
nonetheless be suspect because its holding relied primarily on QuLin,
involved a substantially similar question, and was decided relatively
soon after by substantially the same justices. The farther a decision
gets from the type of flaws reflected in Quiin,however, the harder it
becomes to choose between the two stories. In fact, for many or
perhaps even most wartime cases, the two stories may actually be in
equipoise--equally persuasive."' A judge may still have an opinion as
to which story is truer and that opinion may still be useful in
considering a current wartime case, but it becomes much harder to say
that one story or the other should be given a doctrinal role.316 The
broader version of Model 1 may better capture what people mean
when they call upon judges to learn the lessons of history, but it is
much more difficult to form into a stare decisis principle.
2.

Model 2: History Augments

A second potential way the lessons of history might be relevant to
determining the stare decisis effect of these wartime decisions is as a
type of precedent-replacement. In the absence of judicial opinions
developing and testing the holdings of these wartime cases, we might
instead look to the acts and opinions of various extrajudicial actors.
Even where courts have been silent, time and experience might thus
still "work the law pure.'3 7
315. For example, take Eisentrager,339 U.S. 763 (1950). One might point to the fact
that Eisentragerwas decided by the same FDR Court that fell over itself to rubber stamp the
President's policy in Quihn, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). Justice Jackson, who wrote the opinion in
Eisenrager,apparently favored an even more deferential decision in Quirin than the one
Chief Justice Stone ended up writing. See Vizquez, supra note 35. Eisentrager,the
argument might go, thus reflected the same overeagerness to defer to Executive wartime
policy. But Jackson also dissented in Korematq 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and overruled the
President in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Putting
Eisentragerin the context of those opinions might make it look judicious, well-reasoned, and
responsible.
316. See mfia notes 345-372 and accompanying text (discussing Model 3).
317. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
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This use of extrajudicial sources as precedent actually has a long
pedigree in U.S. foreign relations and national security law. For
various reasons that include separation of powers concerns embedded
in the political question doctrine, courts rarely rule on major questions
of foreign affairs or war-making authority. As a result, scholars,
courts, and government actors have long turned to political branch
precedents to help determine the meaning and scope of various foreign
affairs and national security powers. Perhaps the most well-known
endorsement of this use of history is Justice Frankfurter's statement in
his Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyerconcurrence that
a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government,
may be treated as a gloss on "executive Power" vested in the President
by § 1 of Art. IV.3i

But endorsements of the importance of political branch history in this
area are widespread."9
Korematsu; a decision not directly considered here, presents a
good example of how this Model 2 version of history's lesson might
undermine the authority of a particular decision."' No Court has yet
had the opportunity to opine directly 2' on the status of Korematsu as
precedent, but other actors have been quite vocal in rejecting the
opinion. Congress expressed its displeasure in the 1971 Non-

318. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
319. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 327-28
(1936) ("A legislative practice such as we have here, evidenced not by only occasional
instances, but marked by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a half of time,
goes a long way in the direction of proving the presence of unassailable ground for the
constitutionality of the practice, to be found in the origin and history of the power involved, or
in its nature, or in both combined."); see also Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of
Formalism, 68 N.YU. L. REv. 1338, 1355 (1993) (book review) ("It is rather the 'court of
history,' an accretion of interactions among the branches, that gives rise to basic norms
governing the branches' behavior in the area." (footnote omitted)).
320. 323 U.S. 214.
321. A number of Supreme Court justices have derided the decision in passing. See
Eric L. Muller, 12/7 and 9/11: War, Liberties,and the Lessons ofHistory,104 W VA. L. REv.
571, 586 (2002) (citing statements in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion, joined by Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas);
id at 244 (Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); id. at 275 (Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting); Metro Broad. v. EC.C., 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy & Scalia, JJ.,
dissenting).
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Detention Act, 22 by legislating that "[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of
Congress."323 Congress went even further in 1988, granting an official
apology, payments of $20,000 to each surviving internee, and the
establishment of a public education fund.3 21 Similarly, President
Clinton spoke for the Executive Branch in repudiating the decision by
bestowing the Medal of Freedom on Fred Korematsu12 Outside the
government, there appears to be near universal agreement
that the
26
decision was wrong and a stain on the Court's record.
None of the four decisions here reflect such a clear record of
official and unofficial repudiation. Qu/h 27 and Yamashit'2 8 probably
come closest. While the Japanese Internment was clearly the focus of
the Non-Detention Act, it could be argued that the Act's prohibition on
unilateral executive detention was enacted with the Roosevelt
Administration's entire record in mind, including the detention of the
Nazi saboteurs in QuiYn." 9 Multiple Justices involved in the Quinn
decision also questioned what they had done. Aside from that, both
Quinn and Yamashita have been widely condemned by scholars-the
former for the Court's questionable departures from normal
procedure. and the latter for the Court's willingness to overlook the
blatant unfairness of Yamashita's military trial.' Eisenage and
/rotd33 may have their detractors, but it is hard to argue that there is
any sort of consensus, official or unofficial, that they were wrongly
decided. The most one could say of those is that some consensus has
coalesced that the Court was too deferential to the government's World
322. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 542 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Congress meant to preclude another episode like the one described in Korematsuv. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)."). See genemlly Louis Fisher, CRS Report for Congress:
Detention of U.S. Citizens (Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22130.pdf
(summarizing debates in Congress over the act).
323. 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006).
324. See Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege." JapaneseAmenican Redress
andthe 'Racing"ofArabAmericansas "Terrorists,"8 AsIAN L.J. 1, 1 (2001).

325. Patrick J.Leahy, Fear,Freedom, and the Rule of Law, 31 VT.L. REv. 439, 445
n.23 (2007).
326. See discussion supm note 26.
327. 317U.S. 1(1942).
328. 327U.S. 1(1946).

329. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 542-45 (2004) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
330. Vizquez, supra note 35, at 246.
331. Landrum, supra note 236, at 296-97.
332. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
333.

338 U.S. 197 (1948).
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War 1-era excesses, an assessment capacious enough to include all
four decisions considered here.
It is far from clear that such a broad version of Model 2's
extrajudicial precedent warrants a doctrinal role in determining a
decision's stare decisis effect. The notable narrowness of Justice
Frankfurter's formulation is illustrative. Justice Frankfurter confines
the relevance of historical practice to those that are "systematic,"
"unbroken," and "never before questioned," where Congress and the
President have consistently concurred.3 ' Other justices and scholars
have treated political branch practice far less strictly, finding authority
in much more fleeting practices and much less clear consensus."' But
Frankfurter's caution is understandable. Integrating a consistent
practice of both political branches into a doctrinal analysis can be
relatively straightforward, but once these standards are loosened things
become far less clear. How many instances of a particular practice
must one find? How much congressional dissent can be brushed
aside?
Using extrajudicial sources as replacement-precedent faces the
same problems. So long as all actors have spoken and are in apparent
agreement about a particular decision, as they appear to be in
Korematsd3 6 and may be in Quirh,3 it may be relatively easy to use
their views as a gloss on the decision's meaning and authority. 8 But
where they disagree, or even remain silent, as they arguably have with
4 it is far less clear
3 Hirota,340 and Eisentrager,
regard to Yamashita,
that they should have that role. Moving from official to unofficial
views presents similar problems. While asking what the public thinks
of a particular wartime decision has some visceral appeal, the question
is far from simple. Who is the public, and how does one ascertain its
Are legal scholars stand-ins? How about historians?
views?
Commentators seem in general agreement on Yamashita, but views of
334. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
335. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting
Frankfurter but finding congressional acquiescence and Executive practice based on less than
clear evidence and reasoning by analogy); see also POSNER & VERMEULE, supranote 18, at 48
(criticizing Dames & Moore on that basis).
336. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
337. 317 U.S. 1(1942).
338. This is of course assuming, as we consistently have here, that the opinion has not
been approved by a later court or relied upon by the public.
339. 327 U.S. 1(1946).
340. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
341. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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Esentrageror Hirota are less clear. What if, as in the case of the two
stories described above," commentators disagree? Does the majority
story or the conventional wisdom win out?
Using Model 2 this way also threatens to be massively
destabilizing. One need only think of an initially unpopular decision
like Brown v BoardofEducationto see the potential problem with any
rule that requires less than complete consensus to negate an opinion's
precedential effect.43 Looser versions of Model 2 would incentivize
any group of actors who dislike a particular opinion to make sure they
are the loudest voices heard. Altogether, such difficulties suggest that
anything beyond clear official repudiation of a decision is best
excluded from the initial stare decisis analysis?
3.

Model 3: History Tests

Both of the first two Models present plausible accounts of how
the "lessons of history" might undermine the precedential value of
particular decisions and may capture what some observers mean when
they appeal to history's lessons. But both are pretty technical, focused
on the flaws or perceptions of particular cases or categories of cases.
Many of the appeals to history, on the other hand, seem much more
expansive, sweeping across the entire category of wartime cases to
glean broad lessons in constitutional principle. Such lessons might
teach that minorities are particularly vulnerable in wartime and that
courts must be equally vigilant in protecting their rights, 5 or that the
Executive branch will claim as much authority as it can in a crisis (for
both noble and ignoble reasons) and that courts must not abdicate their
own role too easily, ' or that the Executive branch often overstates the
threats faced by the country and that its claims must thus be carefully
scrutinized." Even those who read history the opposite way often
paint with broad strokes, learning from the grand pattern of wartime
cases that courts are wise to defer to Executive expertise during an
emergency or that "the constitution is not a suicide pact" and that civil

342. See supranotes 18-19, 249-250 and accompanying text.
343. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see Barry Friedman, The Birth ofan Academic Obsession:
The History of the CountermajoriananDifficulty PartFive, 112 YALE L. 153, 185-92
(2002) (discussing the public reaction to Brown).
344. Though of course other views of the decision may factor into the traditional
factors for overcoming the stare decisis presumption once it attaches. See supra Part H.B.
345. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 238-241 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 237-241 and accompanying text.
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liberties must take a backseat to national survival? 8 Such broad
lessons seem to be best captured by a third Model of history's potential
use: history as a vehicle for constitutional principle.
At first glance, such appeals look suspiciously like the sorts of
the "law-office histories" so often derided by historians and legal
scholars alike? 9 Law-office history describes the way lawyers and
judges selectively quote history to affirm a desired legal argument or
preconceived belief. As one critic explains, law-office history involves
"the selection of data favorable to the position being advanced without
regard to or concern for contradictory data or proper evaluation of the
relevance of the data proffered.... Law-office history has also been
criticized for its undisciplined presentism, treating historical facts as if
they occurred today rather than recognizing the unique context of the
past."' As a result, some law-office histories have been so far removed
from any historical reality as to subject judges accepting them to
ridicule. "2 Finding evidence of broad constitutional principles in the
flaws of a select group of cases might fall into this same trap.
But, some have suggested that there are defensible ways to use
history as a source of constitutional principle or meaning, even where
the historical story told would not meet historians' standards. John
Reid recounts that "forensic" history, an "imagined" history of
constitutional principles, has served as a powerful restraint on both
government and judges by providing an imagined, but widely believed
set of traditions that cannot easily be set aside."' Others have noted
that history can play an important rhetorical, discursive, 5" or
348. SeePOSNER&VERMEULE, supranote 18, at 21-3 1.
349. See, e.g., Sunstein, supm note 267, at 603-04 (criticizing constitutional lawyers
who draw concrete lessons from highly generalized readings of history or who f-ind lessons in
history that simply replicate their political commitments); Flaherty, supa note 265, at 554
("Here legal scholars, in what in its worst form is dubbed 'law office history,' notoriously pick
and choose facts and incidents ripped out of context that serve their purposes."); Reid, supra
note 266, at 197-203 (discussing criticism of law-office history).
350. Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv.
119, 122 n.13 (1965); see also Reid, supra note 266, at 204 ("Law office history does not lead
the judge to a decision. In almost every instance when history is employed, the decision has
already been formulated. Unprofessional history is used to explain the decision, to make the
decision more palatable, or, in most cases, to justify the decision.").
351. See Festa, supranote 254, 482-83.
352. See, e.g., Sunstein, supa note 267, at 604 (criticizing Robert Bork's use of
history); Reid, supra note 266, at 198 (ridiculing Justice Blackmun as "the pot calling the
kettle black" for ridiculing Justice Scalia for treating history as a "grab-bag"); Reid, supra
note 266, at 203, 219 (discussing criticism of Justice Black).
353. Reid, supranote 266, at 203-22.
354. See Laura Kalman, BorderPatrol: Reflections on the Turn to History in Legal
Scholarsyp,66 FORDHAM L. REv. 87, 112-14 (1997).
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pedagogical 5 ' role by serving as a vessel for, as a means of
communicating, abstract constitutional traditions and principles. "7
There is, nonetheless, a serious danger that history will be misused.
As Reid notes: "It is an open question, even when judges employ the
past in a good-faith effort toward neutral judgment, whether they can,
in fact, select by some historical method data that will safely
guide
35 8
choice.
personal
by
predetermined
not
them to conclusions
One key to using this Model responsibly is recognizing that the
constitutional principles are not dictated by the past. Instead, the story
handed down, to the extent it resonates and is persuasive, helps the
present generation to understand and test its own political
commitments.359 This is part of what distinguishes Model 3 from the
broader versions of Model 136° Broader versions of Model 1 try to

draw broad (and possibly indefensible) historical patterns from a few
historical data points. 61 They might, for example, look at the flaws of
&6 2 and use them as proof that the government has and will
Quiril
overreach in wartime. The flaws of Quinn serve a different role in
Model 3. Model 3 asks not what Qu-n proves, but instead how we
react to it. The flaws of Quinn are used to test our understanding of
constitutional principles.
Those flaws might convince us that
deference in wartime carries too many risks to the rule of law and that
as a result we want courts to be more vigilant in their scrutiny of the
Executive. Alternatively, we might look at Quinn and note that the
saboteurs had been guilty and that despite its flaws no long-term harm
was done to the Constitution. Based on this assessment, we might
decide that some additional deference to the Executive in wartime
might be desirable.
363
In a sense, Model 3 thus uses the history of cases like Qaij'n,

365
Yamashita,36 Hirota,
or Eisentragel66 as a real-life law school

355. See Primus, supranote 309 (criticizing the use of historical facts in this way).
356. See generally Rebecca L. Brown, Tradltion and Insigh4 103 YALE L.J. 177
(1993).
357. See Primus, supra note 309, at 173 ("Nonetheless, it is a feature of American
constitutional discourse that narratives and images from American history are invested with
meaning, and those meanings are sometimes presented as embodying deep truths about
American constitutional history. These conceptions of history are among the influential
sources of value in constitutional adjudication." (footnote omitted)).
358. Reid, supra note 266, at 223.
359. Cf Kalman, supra note 354, at 124 ("For what we all say about the past and
history tells us something about the past and history but even more about ourselves").
360. See supranotes 299-316 and accompanying text.
361. See discussionsupra note 309.
362. ExparteQuirin,317 U.S. 1(1942).
363. Id
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hypothetical. Our present day reactions to the cases and the relative
persuasiveness of particular "lessons" derived from them help us to
test and, in the end, understand what we believe about the constitutional principles at issue.367 Whereas the first two Models of history
look at the past-the first at the history of the decision itself and the
second at the subsequent history of reactions to the decision-Model 3
thus focuses on the present. In this third Model, the question is how
people today come to understand the meaning of a particular decision
and its history.
A version of this Model might be seen in Justice Kennedy's
Boumediene opinion."' Rejecting the idea that the pre-1789 history of
habeas corpus is dispositive in determining the scope of the suspension
clause, Kennedy instead finds in the history a story of constitutional
principle.369 The history of habeas in Britain illustrates a deep and
longstanding rejection of unreviewable executive authority and
commitment to separation of powers.37 ° It is this historical principle
that then guides his interpretation of both the Suspension Clause and
the meaning of Eisentrager." '
This may be an attractive understanding of what the lessons of
history can do and may better capture what commentators mean than
the first two Models. Its subjectivity, however, makes it much more
controversial and considerably more problematic to doctrinalize. This
Model of the lessons of history, by its nature, recognizes that
constitutional meaning will be a battleground on which opposing
histories are arrayed against each other.33 Under Model 3, the

364. 327 U.S. 1(1946).
365. 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
366. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
367. For an example of how history can be used this way, see generally Richard A.
Primus, The Riddle ofHim Revels, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1681 (2006).
368. 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008).
369. See id at 2249 ("We find the evidence as to the geographic scope of the writ at
common law informative, but, again, not dispositive.").
370. Id.
at 2246 ("This history was known to the Framers. It no doubt confirmed their
view that pendular swings to and away from individual liberty were endemic to undivided,
uncontrolled power. The Framers' inherent distrust of governmental power was the driving
force behind the constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent
branches.").
371. Id at 2259. In other words, the facts of history are not the key here-in fact, they
seem to provide no answer at all. Instead, by reflecting on the history, Justice Kennedy gains
greater insight into his own views on why habeas is important.
372. See generally Primus, supra note 309 (arguing that constitutional historians
should develop mobilizable counter-histories to combat entrenched views of constitutional
meaning). Justice Stevens' discussion of Wiley Rutledge's dissent in Yamashita might be an
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meaning of Quirn,3" Yamashita,' Hirotaj5 or Eisentage 6 will be
determined not by the past, but by our assessment of it. Whether
eventual victory goes to those telling a cautionary tale about wartime
overreaching or those praising our flexible wartime constitution will be
largely determined by the persuasiveness of their account. The events
of the past do not dictate a victor. Accordingly, such a Model seems
much better situated to help a Court to decide whether to uphold or
overrule a prior precedent than to determine whether it should be
treated as precedent at all.
D

Lessons Learned

So what do the lessons of history tell us to do with the four
undead wartime cases here? Are they to be killed or saved? As the
three Models above indicate, much depends on what we mean by the
lessons of history.
There is a powerful case to be made that where the lessons of
history fall into the narrower formulations of Model 1, they should
prevent the initial attachment of stare decisis to the decision. Thus
where history uncovers facts about the original decision that might
undermine its procedural or substantive legitimacy, as it appears to do
with regard to Qu!in, that decision should carry no presumption of
authority. " Courts need not ignore it-they might still find its
reasoning on one issue or another persuasive-but they also need not
feel beholden to it. This version of the lessons of history, however, is
very narrow and only speaks to the stare decisis effect of Quhin and
possibly Yamashita. Other versions of this Model might be broad
enough to speak to HIrota and Eisentagerbut draw lessons far too
debatable to justify negating those decisions' precedential value
altogether.
A similar story can be told about Model 2. Where a decision has
not been reaffirmed over some long period of time and political actors
attempt to at writing such a counter-history. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 618 (2006).
See discussion supranotes 130-134 and accompanying text.
373. ExparteQuirin,317U.S.1(1942).
374. InreYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
375. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
376. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
377. As mentioned above, which aspects of the holding will be deemed nonprecedential depends on what about the decision is flawed. If the problem is factual, then only
those aspects of the decision based on those facts need be disqualified. If, however, the issue
is procedural, then the entire decision might be tainted. See supra note 283 and
accompanying text.
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and the public are unified in their opposition to it, there appears to be
good reason to deny the decision a presumption of stare decisis effect.
Such a situation might be thought of as the desuetude of an opinion.
But none of the four decisions meet this test and only Qun7n and
Yamashita come close.
Model 3 is more expansive and could speak to the fate of all four
opinions. But by moving its focus off the particular decision in
question and onto broad constitutional principles, it also ceases to
speak directly to the legitimacy of the prior precedent. Model 3
lessons of history may disapprove of the rule in Hirotaor Eisentrager,
but they do not suggest that those decisions never had any stare decisis
value at all.
This does not make Model 3 useless in deciding the fate of these
wartime cases. On the contrary, Model 3 lessons may actually be
determinative of whether a case like Hirotalives on or is killed off. As
explained above, even if stare decisis does initially attach to these
opinions, their uniqueness and long absence from the scene makes the
pull of stare decisis on them weak. Whether to keep the rule or
overrule it may turn completely on the Model 3 lessons of history we
find most persuasive. If the Court is persuaded that the history of
wartime cases is one of over-deference by courts, that history should
be strong enough to break any weak ties tethering us to the prior
opinion. H!rot4, a decision with particularly weak ties to stare decisis
(or Quinn or Yamashita for that matter) can be put to rest. The other
story, that the Constitution is not a suicide pact and must be flexibly
interpreted in emergencies, would have the opposite effect. That story
suggests that peacetime thinking and precedent is simply irrelevant to
emergencies and must be discounted. When those are removed from
the equation, the stare decisis pull on these wartime decisions looks
strong. For one who finds that history persuasive, Hirotawill look as
alive as it did five decades ago.
Even where the ties of stare decisis are stronger, as they may be
with regard to Eisentiager,there may still be a role for Model 3 history.
The narrow versions of Model 1 and Model 2 are quite powerful,
perhaps eliminating stare decisis altogether, but their use depends on
the absence of judicial reaffirmations of the rule. If a rule in Quin is
considered and reaffirmed in cases lacking Qin's flaws, as some
arguably were in Hamdi and Hamdan, those new decisions can
essentially buff the rule clean. Similarly, if we knew of procedural
errors in Eisentrager,its reconsideration in Verdugo-Urquidez might
have eliminated the applicability of Model 1 to its holding. The same
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is true of Model 2. If future courts reaffirm a particular rule, Model 2
historical claims become nothing more than a battle between branches.
In both cases, we may be concerned with exactly how and when the
rule is reaffirmed- Yamashita's quick reaffirmation of Quh-7 may not
count nor might an unthinking string cite-but in general, decisions
will have to be truly undead for the first two to apply.
Model 3, however, is not constrained in that way. Although
Model 3 arguments about historical principles will be particularly
powerful when a decision is undead, for example, in Hiro, they will
continue to have force even after a decision is reaffirmed. If a
persuasive historical story suggests that one decision, for example,
Eisentrager,was a wrong turn, a decision reaffirming it, for example,
Verdugo-Urquidez, will simply seem another step in the wrong
direction. An increasing number of reaffirmations might diminish the
persuasiveness of a historical story, but it cannot convince a believer
that that story is wrong.
Notably, although each of the three Models endorsed here
suggests that stare decisis can be overcome by history in at least some
circumstances, all three generally cabin the destabilizing effects that
might be associated with such a rule. Models 1 and 2 require
extraordinarily specific facts and a clear absence of societal reliance on
a decision. Arguments based on Model 3 will generally only be
persuasive to the extent to which they resonate with widely held
understandings about the law.378 Applied in the rigorous ways
described above, all three Models may be able to keep their
destabilizing effects within relatively confined limits.
IV

EPILOGUE

Hirota and Eisentqagerremain undead.379 Neither Munaf. ° nor
Boumediend'' fully revived them or dealt the fatal blow. Given the
apparent inapplicability of Models 1 and 2 to those cases, it looks like
their fate will continue to be fought on the battleground of competing
historical and constitutional principles. Meanwhile, the stare decisis
378. Notably, this makes these uses of history to override or undermine stare decisis
considerably less destabilizing than more common originalist attacks on stare decisis. While
originalist arguments against stare decisis often seek to overrule a current position based on
information about what an earlier public expected, the mhove away from a decision here
usually matches public expectations, or at least does not overturn them.
379. Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763
(1950); see supm notes 156-158, 203 and accompanying text.
380. Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).
381. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
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effect of Qu/hn and Yamasta&, which Model 1 might finally have
felled, seem largely moot. Both cases have largely been replaced by
Hamdi and Hamdan.
But the framework developed here may have broader use. First,
today's live terrorism controversies may be tomorrow's undead
precedents. It is impossible to predict which of today's precedents will
continue to be cited and which will be forgotten, but much as World
War II revived the importance of Ex parteMilligad82 and the War on
Terror revived Qu/inn, a conflict decades away may awaken some
forgotten War on Terror case. We do not know how history will treat
the current cases, but the framework in this Article could help in
considering their eventual fate.
Moreover, claims about the lessons of history are widespread
across the law and the Models developed here should have at least
some applicability beyond undead wartime cases. Although broader
versions of Models 1 and 2 meant to extrapolate defects from wartime
cases generally were considered above,383 those versions appear to be
too flawed to really use. Instead the strongest versions of Models 1
and 2 look at an individual decision itself; that decision's context,
wartime or otherwise, is relevant only insofar as it produces the
specific flaws in or the specific reaction to that decision itself.
Accordingly, arguments from Models 1 and 2 can be made about any
long-forgotten case that is either deeply flawed or roundly renounced.
Wartime is more important to Model 3, at least insofar as it looks for
broad lessons that can be learned and applied to some category of
cases, but the standards it lays out for using the lessons of history as
vehicles for constitutional principles are widely applicable to any area
where constitutional traditions or counter-traditions are invoked.
Although this Article cannot determine the fate of every historical
claim against every decision-each decision must be considered
individually-my hope is that the framework for thinking about
history's lessons described here can at least provide a place to start.

382. 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
383. See supra notes 299-316, 339-344 and accompanying text.
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